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INVESTIGATORY POWERS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMDISSION
THE Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19 3 4 2 seek
to establish a protective control over the process of soliciting business capi-
tal from the public, and over the business of trading in securities. To this end,
both statutes require full and accurate information of the financial structure of
issuers of securities3, so that adequate and truthful information may be avail-
able to investors to enable them to determine the investment risk of securities
sold on the national securities exchanges or in interstate commerce.4 In addi-
tion to compelling a disclosure of such information by issuers of securities, the
dealing in securities is carefully regulated to prevent practices which are deemed
subversive of fair dealing.5 Finally, to develop and perfect the regulation, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which is charged with the administration
of these Acts, is empowered to issue rules and regulations, and to recommend to
Congress further legislation along designated lines.0 To enable the Commission
1. 48 STAT. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 a, et seq. (1933), as amended by 4S STAT. 905, 15 U. S.
C. A. § 776 et seq. (1934).
2. 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. A. § 7a et seq. (1934).
3. Securities Act § 7, Schedules A and B; Exchange Act §§ 12, 13.
4. 78 CONG. Ec. 7704 (1934); Douglas and Bates, The Fedoral Srcuri!irs Act of 1933
(1933) 43 YATx L. J. 171, 172.
5. Securities Act § 17; Exchange Act §§ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15; s Legis. (1934)
83 U. or PA. L. Rm,. 255.
6. Securities Act §§ 19 (a), 211; Exchange Act §§ 11 (e), 12 (f), 19 (c), 23 (a).
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properly to carry out the purposes of the Acts, it has been granted broad powers
of investigation. 7 Thus, compulsory investigatory powers are given, first, for
the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of information required to be set
forth by issuers of securities in registration statements under the Securities Act,
and in application statements and reports under the Securities Exchange Act;
second, for the purpose of determining whether the numerous statutory regula.
tions are being obeyed; and third, for the purpose of accumulating information
upon the basis of which it may prescribe such rules and regulations as it is
authorized to make under the two Acts, and also make recommendations to Con-
gress for additional legislation. Opposed to these powers stand the Fourth and
Fifth amendments of the Federal Constitution, guaranteeing freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and protecting an individual from compulsory
self incrimination.8
The Securities Act requires that a registration statement containing detailed
information concerning the issuer shall be in force as to any security sought to
be sold in the channels of interstate commerce or through the mails.8 As one
,means 9 of assuring that the information set forth in the registration statement
shall be accurate, the Securities and Exchange Commission is empowered to
suspend any registration statement when it appears that a material fact is falsely
reported, or is omitted.10 And by Section 8(e) of the Act, the Commission,
in order to determine whether a registration shall be suspended, is empowered
to examine the issuer, underwriter or any other person,11 and to obtain access
7. Securities Act §§ 8 (e), 19 (b); Exchange Act § 21 (a), (b).
8. It is assumed that the other provisions of the statutes are constitutional, and there-
fore that the information demanded in the registration statement under the Securities Act,
and the application and reports under the Securities Exchange Act, supra note 3, may
constitutionally be required.
9. Section 24, Securities Act, and Section 32, Exchange Act provide criminal penalties
for wilful misstatements in documents filed with the commission. See MacIntyre, Criminal
Provisions of the Securities Act and Analogies to Similar Criminal Statutes (1933) 43 YAnS
L. J. 254. Section 11, Securities Act, and Section 18, Exchange Act, imposing civil
liabilities for misstatements in informational documents which issuers and others must file
with the Commission, provide another means of compelling accurate disclosure. See Shul-
man, Civil Liability and the Securities Act (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 227; Comment (1934)
44 YALE L. J. 456.
10. Securities Act § 8 (d). See Rodell, Regulation of Securities by the Federal Trade
Commission (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 272.
11. The phrase "any other person" used in this section would seem to empower the
Commission to obtain access to the books and papers of persons other than the issuer
who is being investigated, if such were relevant to the matter under inquiry. In this
respect the act confers broader powers of investigation upon the Commission than are
possessed by the Federal Trade Commission, 38 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 49
(1926), or Interstate Commerce Commission, 41 STAT. 493 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 20 (5)
(1926). The latter may obtain access to the books and papers of only such corporations
as are being directly investigated. However, the tax statutes apparently empower agents
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to gain access to the books and papers of third partiea
as well as the taxpayer. 45 STAT. 872, 26 U. S. C. A. § 1247 (1928).
(Vol, 44
COMMENTS
to and demand the production of any relevant books and papers.'2 In the event
of a refusal to comply with a request of the Commission for access to books and
papers, the Commission may resort to the federal district courts to obtain a
mandamus compelling compliance with the request. The power to obtain this
mode of judicial coercion seems to be made available to the Commission by
Section 20(c) of the Act, which endows federal district courts with jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus commanding any person to comply with the pro-
visions of the Act. Since it is expressed in Section 8(e) that the Commission
shall have access to, and may compel the production of books and papers of any
person, it would appear that mandamus issued against any person, compelling
him to permit the Commission to have access to his books and papers, would be
proper under Section 20(c) as commanding compliance with the provisions of
the Act. The appearance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of
books and papers before the Commission, in an examination to determine
whether a stop order should issue, may be obtained under Section 19(b), wherein
it is provided that for the purpose of all investigations which the Commission
may deem necessary for the enforcement of the Act, the Commission or any per-
sons designated by it are empowered to subpoena witnesses and require the pro-
duction of books and papers. Clearly, an investigation is such a necessary means
of enforcing the stop order provisions of the Act as to be included within Section
19(b). In case of refusal to obey a subpoena issued under Section 19(b), the
Commission may, by Section 22 (b), apply to a federal district court to issue an
order requiring obedience to the subpoena of the Commission. Failure to obey
the order of the Court is made punishable as a contempt thereof.
The counterpart in the Securities Exchange Act of the registration statement
required under the Securities Act is the "application." The Securities Exchange
Act prohibits the sale of any security on a national securities exchange unless
the security is registeredj 3 A condition of procuring the requisite registration
is the filing of an application with the Commission and with the exchange upon
which the issuer contemplates selling the security, which application must con-
tain certain stipulated information and documents relative to the financial struc-
ture and affairs of the issuer.14 Under the Securities Act, as distinguished from
the Securities Exchange Act, an issuer of securities is discharged from rendering
further reports concerning its financial status after it has filed the registration
statement. Provision was therefore not made in the former Act for providing
investors with adequate up-to-date information concerning issuers of securities. s
This was viewed as a definite defect, and to remedy it, the Securities Exchange
Act requires every issuer of a security registered upon a national securities ex-
change to file such annual and quarterly reports as the Commission may pre-
12. Presumably such an examination may be made at any time the registration state-
ment is in effect as to a particular security, since theoretically a stop order may iEue
at any such time. Conversely, once a registration statement has ceased to be effective,
since a stop order could not issue against a nonexistent registration statement, the pawera
of examination conferred in connection therewith would likewise cease.
13. Exchange Act § 12 (a).
14. Exchange Act § 12 (b).
15. See Tracy and McChesney, Thze Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934) 32 MaCr
L. R v. 1025, 1049.
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scribe."' The power to conduct an investigation to determine if any information
set forth in the application or reports is false or misleading is not expressly con-
ferred upon the Commission under the Securities Exchange Act. Since the Com-
mission under the latter Act is not empowered to issue a stop order suspending
the effectiveness of any registration, it accordingly has been granted no special
powers of examination exercisable therewith as it has under Section 8(e) of
the Securities Act. However, under Section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act,
the Commission is empowered to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or
matters which it may deem necessary or proper to aid it in the enforcement of
the provisions of the act. Investigations to determine whether an application
or a report contains a false or misleading statement of a material fact would
appear to be included within that section. For, when the Act requires that
issuers of securities divulge certain information in application statements and
reports, it is logical to suppose that it is accurate information which is required.
Therefore, should the Commission undertake an examination to determine
whether or not the information set forth is accurate, it could validly be said that
it was conducting an investigation of matters which it deems necessary to aid it
in the enforcement of the Act. For the purpose of such an investigation, the
Commission is given the power under Section 21 (b) to subpoena witnesses, and
to compel the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda,
or other records which the Commission deems relevant to the inquiry.
Whether, in such an investigation, the Commission might also send its own
agents to inspect the books and papers of issuers and other persons is not appar-
ent from the face of the Act. It is not expressly given that power in Section
21(b), and it may therefore be argued that the inference is that Congress in-
tended to withhold it. On the other hand, since by Section 23 of the Securities
Exchange Act the Commission is granted the power to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it
by the Act, it may be argued that the Commission could issue a rule author-
izing its agents to obtain access to the books and papers of the issuer and other
persons, upon the ground that such was necessary to determine whether any
information given in an application or report is false or misleading.' 7  But it
is not as yet judicially settled that such an executive rule would suffice to accom-
plish that result. The Supreme Court has not as yet passed upon the issue, and
lower federal courts have divided upon it; two district court decisions holding
that nothing short of an explicit statutory authorization could enable executive
officials to gain access to the books and papers of a concern being investigated, 8
while a circuit court of appeals has held, in a case where no other power of in-
vestigation was available, that an executive order based upon a statutory author-
ity to prescribe such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the pur-
16. Exchange Act § 13. See 78 CONG. REc. 7696, 7704, 8163, 8274, 8284 (1934).
17. The NIRA does not expressly empower the code authorities to inspect the bools
and papers of members of the code. Nevertheless, numerous codes contain a provision
enabling the code authorities to inspect books and papers of members to determine the
accuracy of information required in reports. See, e. g., Metal Etching Code, art. V, § 9;
Fibre Can and Tube Code, art. VII, § 7; Copper Code, art. VI, § 5.
18. Overton Refining Co. v. Terrell, 4 F. Supp. 443 (E. D. Tex. 1933); Amazon
Petroleum Corp. v. Rr. Commission of Texas, S F. Supp. 639 (E. D. Tex. 1934).
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poses of an act would suffice legally to grant that power.' 0 But even though it
were conceded that the power of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
prescribe such rules and regulations as are necessary to execute the functions of
the Securities Exchange Act embraced the legal power to authorize its agents
to obtain access to books and papers, it would still be incumbent upon the Com-
mission to show that such was a necessary means of enabling it to check the
accuracy of information in the application or reports. In view of the Commis-
sion's express powers to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of books
and papers, it may seriously be questioned whether the power to gain direct
access to those books and papers is necessary to enable the Commission to dis-
charge that function.
No question can be raised that the provision of the Fifth Amendment, which
provides that no person shall be compelled to bear witness against himself in a
criminal proceeding, is violated by the granting of the power either to compel
the production of books and papers by subpoena, or to send agents to inspect
them directly. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination has been
extended by judicial construction to administrative as well as criminal proceed-
ings.20 Conceivably, questions asked a witness, or the examination of books and
papers2 ' required to be produced before the Commission may concern matters
tending to indicate that the witness or possessor of the books and papers has
violated provisions of the Acts for which criminal liability is attached. But as
to corporations the Fifth Amendment has no application, -' and as to individuals
it is settled that a statutory immunity against prosecution or subjection to a
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any matters concerning which the per-
son is compelled to testify or produce documentary evidence, renders the compul-
sion of incriminating testimony or documents unobjectionable to the self-incrimi-
nation clause.as Both statutes carry such immunity provisions,2 4 and conse-
quently forestall objection thereto on the ground of the Fifth Amendment.
However, the immunity granted by those statutes does not extend to the situ-
ation where evidence of an incriminating nature is discovered in an examination
of books and papers subsequent to gaining access thereto,2-4 as the Commission
19. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
20. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 562 (1892); McCarthy v. Arndstein,
266 U. S. 34, 40 (1924); Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (W. D. N. Y.
1923); Grant, Self Incrhnination in the Modern American Law (1931) 5 Tmr p.n L. Q.
368, 371.
21. The privilege against self-incrimination extends to the production of incriminating
books and papers as well as oral testimony. See 4 Wroo, Evmzrxcn (2d ed. 1923)
§2264, and cases cited therein.
22. Hale. v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); In re Born Hat Co., 184 Fed. 506 (S. D.
N. Y. 1911), aff'd, 223 U. S. 713 (1912).
23. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); see 4 Wiouom, Evminncz § 2281.
24. Securities Act § 22 (c); Exchange Act § 21 (d). Both sections provide that "no
individual shall be prosecuted or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise. . . 2' It is the general rule that to avail of the privilege against salf-
incrimination, it must be specifically claimed. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U. S. 103 (1927); Pandolfo v. Biddle, 8 F. (2d) 142 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
19351
YALE LAW JOURNAL
may under the Securities Act.25 This fact is nevertheless consistent with the re-
quirements of the Fifth Amendment. The orthodox rule in regard to protection
against disclosure of incriminating evidence is that only such disclosure as is
sought by legal process against a person as a witness, is protected by the Fifth
Amendment.26 Since an inspection of the books and papers of a person at his
office would not involve that person's acting as a witness in response to legal
process, the Fifth Amendment offers no protection against the conduct of such
an examination. Hence, an immunity need not be granted to make valid the
power.
The tenability of objection to investigations by the Commission, whether by
subpoena, or direct access, on the ground that they violate the Fourth Amend-
ment can be considered only in the light of the historical background of that
Amendment, and the rules which the courts have formulated in the process of
adjudging what conduct comes within the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The concept of unreasonable searches and seizures in the
United States had its inception in the deep resentment against the familiar gen-
eral writs of assistance used by officials of the Crown to detect violations of the
smuggling laws.2 7  When there was no restriction upon the use of this legal
process, governmental officials virtually had carte blanche for rummaging
through a person's home or business in search of evidence of evasion of the
smuggling laws. The power was greater than the popular conscience would
tolerate. Accordingly, as an assurance against the future use of such writs, the
Fourth Amendment was written into the federal constitution. That Amend-
ment was drawn in two parts: the first prohibited all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the second prescribed that search warrants should not issue except
upon probable cause particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Since the Amendment did not specify what
searches and seizures were unreasonable, it has remained for the courts to de-
termine that matter.
The courts of the United States were not without common law precedent to
aid them in adjudging what constituted unreasonable searches and seizures.
Antedating the use of writs of assistance in the colonies, was the use of general
warrants by the Crown in England to ferret evidence of opposition to the gov-
ernment by political suspects. 28 Like their counterpart in the colonies, their
25. While the Commission has not the expressed power to obtain access to books and
papers under the Securities Exchange Act, it may request that its officers be permitted
to examine them upon the premises of the person investigated. Since it ma subpoena
such books and papers as are relevant to the matter under inquiry, it is probable that
many persons, though legally not compelled to permit officers to obtain access to their
books and papers, will accede to a request to do so, in order to avert the inconvenience
of bringing them before the Commission, there to be examined. In such a case, however,
the statutory immunity would not attach against any incriminating evidence, as it would
where the books and papers were subpoenaed before the Commission. Cf. Sherwin v.
United States, 268 U. S. 369 (1925); Carman v. United States, 19 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A.
5th, 1927).
26. See Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 597 (1904); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y.
13, 27, 150 N. E. 585, 590 (1926); 4 WIIGORE, Evmr'cz § 2264; Chafee, Progress of
the Law, 1919-1922 (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 673, 696.
27. See Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921) 34 Hntv. L. Rv.v, 361, 364,
28. Id. at 362.
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use was severely disliked. And in the famous case of Entich v. Carrington,1
Lord Camden condemned such general 'warrants first because of their uncer-
tainty, and second because their use was merely to obtain evidence against per-
sons, which he declared to be in violation of the inherent right against self-
incrimination.3" He conceded, however, that the second ground of objection
would not apply to cases involving search for and seizure of articles, the pos-ses-
sion of which in itself was unlawful. These concepts were utilized by the Amer-
ican courts in the determination of what actions were unreasonable searches and
seizures. Thus a search for and seizure of articles of contraband was reasonable
if made under a search warrant based upon probable cause, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and things to be seized.3 ' However, in the ab-
sence of special circumstances not here relevant,32 such a search and seizure
without a search warrant,33 or with a search warrant which was defective by
reason of a failure to show probable cause3 4 or because of the lack of particu-
larity of the place to be searched and things to be seized,3 5 was deemed to be
unreasonable, and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment. And a
search for, and seizure of, papers whose sole value to the government was their
evidential worth as showing the criminality of the possessor was held to be
unreasonable whether obtained without a search warrant, or even with one
which otherwise met all of the requirements of the second clause of the Fourth
Amendment. 6 Hence, the usual test applied by the courts resulted in maling
searches and seizures unreasonable unless the search was for articles of contra-
band, under a search warrant 32 which measured up to the requirements imposed
by the second clause of the Fourth Amendment.
In Boyd v. United States,3 the term unreasonable searches and seizures took
on an extended meaning, and was held to embrace a subpoena duces tecum,
where the object of its use was to compel a person to produce documentary evi-
dence to be used against him in a criminal proceeding or forfeiture, documentary
29. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
30. Fraenkel, supra note 27, at 364; Handler, The Constitutionality of Inve-tigatiors
by the Federal Trade Commission (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 905, 909.
31. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904).
32. There are a relatively small number of situations in which a search and seizure
is deemed to be reasonable even though made without a search warrant. See Co=-nu,
S_.cnC aND S~zzuR (2d ed. 1930) §§ 60-71; Comment (1927) 27 Cor. L. Rzv. 301O, 302.
33. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20 (1925).
34. The federal courts require that "probable cause" which must be shown previous
to the issuance of a search warrant, be based upon definite facts within the Imowledge
of the person filing the affidavit upon which the search warrant is to be issued, and not
alone upon information and belief. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933);
Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922). See Ely, "Probable Causd' in
Connection with Applications for Search Warrants (1928) 13 ST. Louis L. REv. 101.
35. See 1 Coo= rv, ConsrrrronA. Ln=rrATioNs (8th ed. 1927) 621.
36. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Fraenkel, supra note 27, at 379;
1 Coorxy, op. cit. supra note 35, at 624.
37. 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
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evidence which by virtue of its incriminating character was privileged under the
Fifth Amendment. The rationale indulged to justify this extension was that
the compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal
charge against him, or to forfeit his property, accomplished the same purpose
as an ordinary search and seizure, and therefore was similarly defective as con-
trary to the Fourth Amendment. That case may be interpreted either as
holding that a subpoena duces tecum is a search, and as such is unreasonable
when its purpose is to secure incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, or, as holding that while a subpoena duces tecum is not a search,
yet when it is used for the purpose of securing incriminatory evidence in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment, it serves a purpose similar to that of an unreason-
able search, and is therefore similarly defective. The language of the Court,
and its interpretation in the opinions of the dissenting Justices, lead to an in-
ference that the Court conceived of a subpoena as being a search. But the
utter dissimilarity between a search and seizure, as commonly conceived, and a
subpoena duces tecum issuing from a court in an orderly proceeding, renders
the characterization of the latter as a search and seizure of questionable valid-
ity.38 And, further, it may be noticed that if there is a parallel between a sub.
poena duces tecum and a search, it at least has not been sufficient to result in
the courts' treating them as identical; for there has been no attempt to circum-
scribe the issuance of a subpoena with the same formalities which surround the
issuance of a search warrant, in order to accord with a test of reasonableness.
There is no necessity of abiding by the formal rules of showing probable cause
in order validly to issue a subpoena, as there must be previous to the issuance
of a search warrant. 3s Furthermore, unlike the search warrant, which must
particularly describe the article of contraband to be seized, there is no necessity
in a subpoena duces tecum of designating each particular paper which is de-
manded; such papers and books need only be "described with reasonable de-
tail."30  Nevertheless, for the present purpose it is sufficient to accept that the
Boyd case has indicated that where the purpose of a subpoena duces tecum is to
secure incriminating evidence, in contravention to the Fifth Amendment, it is
invalid.
The scope of the Fourth Amendment was further increased by Hale V.
Henkel.4° In an investigation by a federal grand jury of violations of the anti-
trust laws by certain tobacco companies, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to
one of the corporations being investigated, demanding the production of all the
papers, books, and correspondence of the company since its inception. The
avowed purpose of the subpoena was to gain evidence which would prove a
violation of the anti-trust laws and thereby lead to a criminal liability therefor.
The fact, however, that the evidence produced would be of an incriminating
nature against the corporation did not render the subpoena invalid under the
rule of the Boyd case, as it would have if the books and papers had been those
of a private person; for it was held that a corporation did not possess the privi-
38. For criticism of the view that a subpoena duces tecum is a search and seizure,
see 4 WIGuORE, Evmmicz § 2264; Handler, supra note 30, at 913.
39. See Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 554 (1908).
40. 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
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lege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. However, the lan-
guage of the Court indicated that it believed a subpoena duces tecum to be a
search, and as such, subject to the rule of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment regardless of whether a corporation or an individual was concerned.
Whether the case must be interpreted as holding that a subpoena is actually a
search, or only that it is subject to the same rules when it serves the same func-
tion as an unreasonable search, raises the questions already discussed in con-
nection with the Boyd case. At any rate, the Court dearly held that the Fourth
Amendment required that only a reasonable inquiry by the means of a subpoena
duces tecum could be made, and that a demand for all the books and papers of a
corporation was unreasonable because far too sweeping in its terms. It inferred,
however, that a subpoena duces tecum for such books and papers, described in
suitable detail, as were material to the matter under inquiry would bie consistent
with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment; and subsequent cases, accept-
ing this inference, have upheld subpoenas which were very broad in their require-
ments, upon the ground that what was demanded was suitably specified, and
was material to the matter under inquiry.
4 '
It is apparent that since the test of reasonableness is determinative of the
constitutionality of an investigation, there is, and can be, no iron-clad rule appli-
cable to all searches and seizures and to all subpoenas. What is reasonable in
one situation may be unreasonable in another; indeed what is unreasonable at
one period of time may very well, by reason of changed factors, become reason-
able in another. The formal requirements surrounding the search warrant in
searches and seizures in aid of criminal law enforcement have had the virtue of
protecting innocent persons from abuse, but also the demerit of hindering such
enforcement. Yet, the balance has weighed in favor of the former factor, and
the formal requirements must be respected. Should the problem of crime be-
come so acute however, as to necessitate a more adequate method of detection,
it is not too unrealistic to expect that the formal requirements surrounding the
obtaining of a search warrant may be relaxed, and searches and seizures which
are now condemned as unreasonable will become reasonable. In the realm
of government regulation of business, administrative commissions have been
armed with powers of investigation, enabling them to subpoena witnesses, and
compel the production of books and papers, as well as to obtain access to books
and papers.43 The analogies of the law indicate that those powers must be
41. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541 (1903); Hammond Pacting
Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322 (1909); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478 (1913);
Grant and Burlingame v. United States, 227 U. S. 74 (1913); Brown v. United States,
276 U. S. 134 (1928); In re Bornn Hat Co., 184 Fed. 506 (S. D. N. Y. 1911), aid,
223 U. S. 713 (1912); United States v. Watson, 266 Fed. 736 (N. D. Fla. 1920).
42. Concession to efficient law enforcement may be noted in the refusal of the Supreme
Court to hold that "wire tapping" constitutes an unreasonable search and sezure, Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (192S), and in its condoning a search for and seizure of
liquor in an automobile, when the possession therof was illegal, without a search varrant,
and solely upon probable cause. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925).
43. For exhaustive surveys of the instances in which administrative tribunals have been
granted powers of investigation see Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to
Compel Testimony (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rv. 694; Handler, supra note 30.
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exercised in a manner which is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The question of their reasonableness must depend not only upon
how that issue has been decided in analogous situations in the past, but also
upon a balancing of the public necessity of the investigations, under modern
conditions as against the inconvenience and hardship caused those who are
investigated.
Considered in the light of a rule of reason, it is difficult to see that the powers
of investigation granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission to deter-
mine the accuracy of information voluntarily submitted as true, are violative
of the Fourth Amendment. The purpose, namely to check the accuracy of filed
information, is essential to the regulation proposed. And the scope of such an
investigation is limited to that purpose, thereby presenting ascertainable limits
to the investigation. 44 A subpoena duces tecum for the production of such books
and papers as are relevant to the matter of checking the accuracy of the in-
formation would be sufficiently definite to accord with the requirements of the
Hale case.45 Both Acts require, of themselves, that the subpoena be so limited.
Unlike the subpoena duces tecum condemned in the Boyd-case, the purpose of
its use by the Securities Exchange Commission is not to compel a person to
produce documentary evidence to be used against him in a criminal proceeding
in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment; its sole purpose is to
check the accuracy of information voluntarily submitted by an issuer of securi-
ties, to the end of correcting misstatements. Indeed, not only is the purpose
not to compel a person to produce documentary evidence against himself in a
criminal proceeding, but even the effect of compelling any person to produce
evidence which may be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding
is removed by the grant of immunity to individuals against prosecution for or
on account of facts disclosed in documentary evidence produced in response to
44. There are dicta in some decisions involving investigations by the Federal Trade
Commission, to the effect that a complaint must have been filed with the Commtnlon,
or drawn up by it charging a definite violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
previous to conducting an investigation. The purpose of the complaint Is said to be to
draw the bounds of the investigation so that it will be restricted in character. See Federal
Trade Commission v. Lorillard Co., 283 Fed. 999, 1005 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); Federal Trade
Commission v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 Fed. 886, 889 (D. Md. 1922); Federal Trade
Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936, 941 (App. D. C. 1923). Where, how-
ever, investigations are restricted by statute, as in investigations by the Securities Exchange
Commission to check the accuracy of information submitted by issuers of securities, there
is no need to restrict the investigation further by requiring a complaint.
45. The closest analogy to the Securities Exchange Commission's power to conduct an
investigation to check the accuracy of information submitted by issuers of securities Is
the power granted to agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to examine books and
papers, subpoena witnesses, and the production of books and records, in order to ascertain
the correctness of any tax return. 45 STAT. 1142 (1919), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1247 (1928).
The power of the latter to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of any relevant
books and papers of the taxpayer and third parties has uniformly been upheld. Internal
Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (W. D. N. Y. 1923); United States v. First
Nat. Bank of Mobile, 295 Fed. 142 (S. D. Ala. 1924), aff'd, 267 U. S. 576 (1925); In re




a subpoena duces tecum. Under such circumstances, there is no room for in-
voking the rule of the Boyd case to condemn the subpoena duces tecum of the
Commission as unreasonable.
The direct access to the books and papers of issuers, underwriters, and other
persons may be obtained under the Securities Act does not render the provision
unconstitutional. The Act does not authorize a "fishing expedition" through
any and all of the books and papers of the person or corporation investigated,
but permits access only to such papers and books as are relevant to the deter-
mination of the accuracy of information submitted. Since a subpoena duces
tecum, which may be analogized to a search and seizure, is not unreasonable if
only such books and papers as are relevant to the matter under inquiry are de-
manded in a subpoena suitably specifying such books and papers, it should
follow that access to such books and papers as are relevant to the matter under
inquiry likewise would not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. Objec-
tion, therefore, cannot successfully be directed against the constitutionality of
the statutory power, but only against the manner in which the power is exer-
cised. If the Commission attempts to exceed its powers by a search that is
broader than the statute permits, it obviously must fail, if challenged.
11
Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act provide that the
Commission may make investigations to determine whether any person has vio-
lated or is about to violate the provisions of those Acts, or any rules and regu-
lations issued thereunder.46 Investigations for the purpose of discovering viola-
lations of the Acts may be distinguished from the investigations that have been
discussed above, in that inaccuracy of statement is not alone a violation of the
Act, but is such only when it is wilfulP While the Commission may proceed
to such an investigation after a complaint has been lodged with it definitely
charging someone with a violation of those Acts, or of rules and regulations
issued thereunder, the express terms of both Acts negative any possible infer-
ence that the Commission is authorized to conduct such an investigation only
after a complaint has been filed with it. The question raised by construction
of the terms of the Acts is, rather, whether or not the Commission is even re-
stricted to the extent that it must have a reason to believe that there has been
or is about to be a violation before it may conduct an examination. Under
Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission is given power to make
such investigations as it may, "in its discretion", deem necessary to determine
the existence or possibility of a violation. These words dearly indicate that
the Commission is to be the sole judge of whether an investigation should or
should not be made. But, under Section 20(a) of the Securities Act, the Com-
mission is empowered to investigate "whenever it shall appear to the Commis-
sion, either on complaint or otherwise" that there has been or is about to be a
violation. Here it is not clear whether the Commission is to be the sole judge
of appearances, or whether the statute is intended to grant such power only
upon a showing to the satisfaction of a court that the Commission has sufficient
46. Securities Act § 20 (a); Exchange Act § 21 (a).
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facts in its possession to warrant reasonable belief that the Act is being vio-
lated. If the former interpretation is accepted, the question raised by both Acts
is the same, although as will be seen, the answers might well be different for
each Act. On the other hand, should the more narrow interpretation control,
the situation may be reversed. For the purpose of any such investigation, the
Commission is empowered under both Acts to subpoena witnesses, and compel
the production of any books and papers which are relevant to the matter tinder
inquiry.
47
Objection to these investigations on the ground of self-incrimination is fore-
closed by the grant of immunity to all persons who are compelled to testify or
produce documentary evidence in any proceeding instituted by the Commis-
sion.24 While the grant of immunity does not extend to corporations, it will be
recalled that such is not necessary, since they are not accorded the privilege
against self-incrimination. 22  The necessary effect of these facts is that an indi-
vidual who is called upon to testify or produce his personal books and papers
in a proceeding to determine whether he has violated either Act, cannot there-
after be criminally prosecuted thereunder for or on account of any matter con-
cerning which he is compelled to testify or produce evidence, if he asserts his
privilege against self-incrimination at the proceeding. However, any violations
which are uncovered may be enjoined in a suit instituted by the Commission,
on the basis of the information obtained at the hearing.48  Moreover, these illicit
activities possibly may be suppressed by casting the light of unfavorable pub-
licity upon them. Corporations, of course, upon the basis of the evidence gained
at the Commission's proceeding may be subject to fine for violations of the Act,
or may be enjoined from continuing the illegal practices. Moreover, officers of
such corporations may likewise be criminally prosecuted upon the basis of evi-
dence derived from the corporate books and papers. 40
Assuming that under both Acts the Commission is given full discretion as to
when an investigation is needed, then since the subpoena duces tecum provides
47. Securities Act § 19 (b); Exchange Act § 21 (b). Both Acts further provide that
the Commission may either require or permit any person to file with it a statement in
writing, under oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts and
circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. Securities Act § 20 (a); Exchange
Act § 21 (a).
48. The immunity granted by both Acts is only against a criminal penalty or forfeiture,
for or on account of any evidence produced under compulsion at a proceeding instituted
by the Commission; it does not extend to civil suits. Securities Act § 22 (c); Exchange
Act § 21 (d). A suit to enjoin a violation of either Act would be a civil proceeding.
Hence evidence gained by the Commission at one of its investigations might be used in
a suit by it to enjoin any violation of either Act. Securities Act § 20 (b) ; Exchange Act
§ 21 (e). That the facts which are protected from disclosure by the Fifth Amendment
are only those which involve a criminal liability or forfeiture, and not a civil liability,
see 4 WIGmoRE, EvmExcE § 2254. Cf. Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F. (2d)
648 (D. N. J. 1930).
49. An officer of a corporation may not refuse to produce the corporate books and
papers in a proceeding to determine whether there have been statutory violation by either
the corporation or its officers on the ground that such would tend to incriminate him.
Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911); Dreier v. United States, 221 U. S. 394
(1911); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478 (1913).
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the sole means available to the Commission under these investigations for ex-
amining books and papers, objection on the ground of the Fourth Amendment,
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, must take the form of objection
to broad and indefinite subpoenas.50 Where a complaint has been lodged with
the Commission charging a definite violation of either Act, and the investiga-
tion ensuing thereon is focused upon a particular matter, a subpoena for the
production of such books and papers as are relevant to that matter would clearly
not be so broad and indefinite as to constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure. 51 But an investigation undertaken to determine whether either Act has
been violated, or is about to be violated, without a complaint having been filed
with the Commission, and without its definitely charging a violation of either
Act, may take on a wider range. The exact limits of an investigation in such a
case are not so readily determinable.
Nevertheless, such investigations do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. The question again is one of reasonableness. Under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to conduct an in-
vestigation upon its own motion and without a complaint charging a violation
of the Act, in any matter relating to the enforcement of the Act. 2 And the
question of reasonableness has been resolved in favor of the constitutionality of
such investigation.5 3 The justification is that the business of common carriers
is "affected with a public interest." That reason may also be used to hold simi-
lar investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission to be reasonable,
certainly as to investigations under the authority of the Exchange Act, for Con-
gress has found that the transactions regulated by that Act are "affected with a
public interest,"5 4 and the finding can hardly be said to be unreasonable. And,
as to investigations under the Securities Act, while Congress has not found the
matters thereunder similarly to be affected with a public interest, the fact that
50. The rule of the Boyd Case, supra note 37, making a subpoena duces tecum an
unreasonable search and seizure if the purpose of such is to compel a person to give
evidence against himself in a criminal proceeding is inapplicable, for the reason that the
statutory immunity granted against prosecution for or on account of any evidence pro-
duced at a proceeding of the Commission negates any such purpose, and renders impossible
any prosecution on account of the evidence produced.
51. The federal courts have never interfered with investigations pending before the
Federal Trade Commission to determine whether any person or corporation is engaging
in unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commiszion
Act, where such investigations have been made upon complaint lodged with it, or drawn
by it, charging violation of the act. Federal Trade Commision v. Nulomoline Co., 254
Fed. 988 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); T. C. Hurst and Son v. Federal Trade Commission, 26B
Fed. 874 (E. D. Va. 1920); Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 280 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade
Commiwion, 32 F. (2d) 966 (App. D. C. 1929). See AICFAPn.um,-, JUDICIAL Co!.MoL op
THE Fmmn.L TRsnz Co issioN AxD INT==sTATE Comrcn COe. ranss.I., 1920-1930
(1933) 47, 92; Mechem, Fishing Expeditions by Commissions (1924) 22 Minc. L. Rxv.
765, 775.
52. 41 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1929).
53. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 245 U. S. 33 (1917); United States v. New
York Central Rr. Co., 272 U. S. 457, 462 (1926).
54. Exchange Act § 2.
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it has imposed the regulation can be said to indicate that it believes that the sale
of securities through the channels of interstate commerce is so affected.
Furthermore, the question of reasonableness may be resolved in favor of up-
holding the statutory authorization to the Securities and Exchange Commission
to conduct such investigations, by presuming that the statute authorized the
Commission to make investigations in "good faith"," and of only such matters
as are related to both Acts. Since the Commission is legally powerless to com-
pel obedience to a subpoena duces tecum without the aid of a court of law, any
person investigated who might deem the demands of the Commission to be un-
reasonable, may have the question of their validity raised in court before his
compliance is compelled. In such a case the court would determine whether or
not the Commission has acted in "good faith", which would in turn involve a
determination of the subordinate isssues of whether the subpoena duces tecum
is for only such books and papers as are relevant to matters which might con-
stitute a violation of the Acts,50 and suitably specifies the books and papers
demanded. Hence, arbitrary and unwarranted investigations are safeguarded
against. This line of reasoning was adopted in a New York case" to uphold
the constitutionality of the state blue sky law which empowered the attorney
general to conduct an investigation in any case to determine whether the Act
had been violated, without a complaint having been filed with him, or drawn
by him, definitely charging a violation.58 No reason is apparent why the same
reasoning might not also be used to sustain the constitutionality of the Sections
of the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts under consideration.59 Should
the Courts choose, however, to permit full powers of investigation only in re-
spect to a business "affected with a public interest", and confine its finding on
the latter issue to the findings expressed by Congress, 5 4 it would follow that the
power granted under Section 20(a) of the Securities Act was too broad to be
upheld.
Yet, even in the face of such a course by the courts, there is the alternative of
55. Cf. Culver v. Smith, 74 S. W. (2d) 754, 758 (Tex. 1934).
56. Cf. Carlisle v. Bennett, 275 N. Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
57. Dunham v. Ottinger, 243 N. Y. 423, 154 N. E. 298 (1926), appeal to United States
Supreme Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 276 U. S. 592 (1928).
Cf. Northwest Bancorporation v. Benson, 6 F. Supp. 704 (D. Minn. 1934).
58. N. Y. GEN'. Bus. LAW (Cahill, 1921) art. 23A, § 352. Numerous state blue shy
laws authorize security commissions to conduct examinations to determine whether tho
state law has been violated, or is about to be violated, whenever they deem it necesary
to do so. See, e. g., ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 9892; CAr,. GEN. LAwS (Deering,
1931) Act. 3814, § 23; CONN. Gza. STAT. (Supp. 1933) § 1066 b; GA. CODE ANx. (Michie,
i926) § 2928 (71).
59. Actually, the instances in which the Commission may institute an investigation
without a complaint having been filed with it, or drawn by it on the basis of facts in
its possession may be few. The Commission has the power to examine the books, records,
papers, and memoranda of national securities exchanges, members thereof, brokers, and
dealers at any time (see infra page 833), and since virtually every transaction consummated
upon or in connection with any national securities exchange would be revealed thereby,
violations of the Securities Exchange Act, at least, would be shown. The information




construing the Securities Act as giving the Commission power to investigate only
when it could show that it had reason to believe, upon the basis of facts in its
possession, that the Act was being violated. Under such a limitation, the power
seems dearly valid, by analogy to the cases wherein a complaint has been filed
with the Commission.51
A further means of determining whether the provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act have been, or are about to be, violated is provided in Section 17
of that Act. The latter Section prescribes that every national securities ex-
change, every member thereof, and every broker or dealer transacting business
in securities through such member, or creating an over-the-counter market,
"make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such accounts, correspondence, mem-
oranda, papers, books, and other records, and make such reports as the Commis-
sion by rules and regulations may prescribe," and that such papers and records be
subject at any time to "reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations" by
examiners of the Commission. It is clear by the terms of the Act that this latter
section is applicable only to national securities exchanges, members thereof,
brokers, and dealers, and apparently only such books, accounts, correspondence,
memoranda and other papers as the Commission shall require to be made and
kept are subject to examination under this section. However, such books and
papers would appear to be subject to examination at any time, and even though
the Commission had not charged, or even suspected that there had been, a vio-
lation of any provision of the Act. Likewise, reports may be required at any
time the Commission may deem it necessary to call for such.
It is unquestioned that the duty of keeping such books and records as the
Commission shall prescribe, the making of periodic and special reports, and the
submission to periodic and special examinations of such books and records as
are required to be kept, are burdensome. c° Nevertheless, these statutory require-
ments appear to be constitutionally unobjectionable. State statutes requiring
the keeping of books and papers by certain businesses subject to state regula-
tion, and authorizing the inspection thereof at any time by governmental offi-
cials, have uniformly been upheld.0 ' Federal statutes imposing similar duties
upon certain businesses have likewise been sustained. For example, a statutory
authorization to the Interstate Commerce Commission to require periodic or
special reports, 2 to prescribe what accounts and records shall be kept by com-
mon carriers, 6 3 and to examine such accounts and records whenever it deems
60. Cf. FarxrN, A 1niATv Powx.s ovx PmroNs Aim Ps OzTnr (1928) 182.
61. City of St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. W. 101 (1S95); Park v. Cotton
Mills, 75 S. C. 560, 56 S. E. 234 (1906); State v. Davis, 6S W. Va. 142, 69 S. E. 639
(1910); Hughes v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. Rep. 333, 149 S. W. 173 (1912); City of St.
Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543, 201 S. W. 870 (1918); Reaves Warehouse Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 141 Va. 194, 126 S. E. 87 (1925); State v. Legora, 162 Tenm. 122, 34
S. W. (2d) 1056 (1931); Karr v. Baldwin, 57 F. (2d) 252 (N. D. Tex. 1932). But see
Sullivan v. Brawner, 237 Ky. 730, 36 S. W. (2d) 364 (1931).
62. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commk ion, 221 U. S. 612
(1911).
63. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912);
see Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 134, 138 (1932). Under
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, commission merchants, dealers, and brohers,
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it necessary to do so,64 is settled to be valid. Recently, the duty imposed upon
oil producers and refiners, by executive order under the N I R A,05 to render
reports, to keep adequate books and records of all transactions in the produc-
tion and transportation of petroleum, and to permit examination thereof at any
time by government officials was upheld despite the objection that the require-
ment of reports and inspection of books and records constituted unreasonable
searches and seizures.66 The basis of the court's holding was that the making
of reports and the inspection of books and records were a necessary means of
effectuating the purpose of the oil code.
More directly in point is a recent case67 decided by a federal circuit court of
appeals involving the requirement under the Grain Futures Act 8 that brokers
of the .Chicago Board of Trade submit reports and permit an inspection of their
books and papers by agents of the Department of Agriculture. Objection was
made that the requirement of reports and inspection of books and papers when
the brokers had not been charged with, or even suspected of having violated
the Act, constituted unreasonable searches and seizures. In overruling the ob-
jection, and thereby sustaining the statutory provision, the court held that the
business of dealing in grain futures was one which was affected with the public
interest, and in such a case, where reports and an inspection of books and papers
were a reasonably necessary means of accomplishing the purpose of the Act, the
Fourth Amendment had no application. This case provides direct precedent
for the sustenance of the Section under consideration. In the Securities Ex-
change Act, Congress has declared that transactions in securities as conducted on
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets, are "affected with a public
interest. 15 4 This finding should suffice to place the inspection provisions of this
statute within the same category as those of the Grain Futures Act. Further-
more, as in the case of the latter statute, it may be shown that those provisions
in the Securities Exchange Act are a necessary means of enabling the Commis-
sion properly to discharge its statutory duties. If the Commission is to prevent
manipulations, it must have ready access to information which will disclose
manipulations when fluctuations in securities indicate that they might be in
in perishable commodities are required to keep such books, records, and memoranda as
fully disclose their business dealings. 46 STAT. 535 (1930), 7 U. S, C. A. § 559 (1934).
Under the Federal Water Power Act, the Federal Power Commission may require licensed
water power companies to keep designated books, papers, and accounts. 41 STAT. 1353
(1921), 16 U. S. C. A. § 797 (1926).
64. United States v. Clyde Steamship Co., 36 F. (2d) 691 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert.
denied 281 U. S. 744 (1930). Federal reserve banks and members thereof are subject to
examination of their accounts, books, and affairs by government examiners at the discre-
tion of the Federal Reserve Board. 38 STAT. 261 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. § 248a (1926).
National banks may be examined at least twice a year. 38 STAT. 271 (1913), 12 U, S,
C. A. § 481 (1926). The Federal Power Commission may examine at any time the books,
papers and records of licensees. 41 STAT. 1353 (1921), 16 U. S. C. A. § 797 (1926),
65. See MAYERs, A HANDnooK OF N. R. A. (2d ed. 1934) 386.
66. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
67. Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert. denied
290 U. S. 654 (1933). See Langeluttig, Constitutional Limitations on Administratlve Power
of Investigation (1933) 28 ILL. L. REV. 508.
68. 42 STAT. 1003 (1922), 7 U. S. C. A. § 12 (1926).
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progress. The books and papers of the exchanges, members thereof, dealers,
and brokers would disclose such; and only if the Commission were able immedi-
ately to see them, could it prevent manipulations before they had run their de-
structive course. Access to such books and papers, moreover, would reveal in-
fractions of thedaw by outside traders as well as members of exchanges, brokers,
and dealers. That fact, of itself, would provide a powerful deterrent to viola-
tions of the Act.
The fact that infractions of the statute by national securities exchanges, mem-
bers thereof, brokers, dealers, or even third parties may be revealed in the reports
which are required, or in the inspection of books and papers under Section 17,
and may thereby tend to subject them to criminal liability, does not make the
Section defective as contrary to the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth
Amendment. The fact that third parties may be incriminated by evidence dis-
closed in an inspection of books and papers, or in a report, provides no objec-
tion to such inspection or report; for the privilege against self-incrimination is
personal and extends only to the person who is compelled to produce evidence
against himself. 9 As to members of national securities exchanges, brokers and
dealers, it may be held, following numerous state decisions, that a crime dis-
closed in books and papers required by law to be kept, does not privilege the
person keeping such books and papers to withhold them from inspection on the
ground that they would tend to incriminate him."0 This rule has been enunci-
ated in the interests of assuring an efficient administration of regulatory statutes,
and that same reason would render it applicable to the Section under considera-
tion. The rationale indulged to justify this holding is that the state requires
the books and redids to be kept but does not require the person to commit a
crime, and if in the course of committing a crime he makes entries, the crimi-
nality of his entries exists by his own choice, and not by compulsion. Further-
more, the duty imposed by the law to make entries and keep books is anterior
to and independent of the crime. 1 This line of reasoning would likewise be ap-
plicable to the making of reports where the information demanded is known
to the person making the report previous to the occurrence of the illegal act,
the disclosure of which would incriminate him.72 But where special reports are
demanded, in which information is sought that was not theretofore required to
be kept on record, as they may be under Section 17 of the Securities Exchange
Act, that reasoning would have no application. In that case, consistently with
the Fifth Amendment, only such information as does not incriminate the person
submitting it could be required in the special reports. Hence, under these cir-
cumstances, while a broker, dealer, or member of an exchange may be required
to submit reports under this Section, when some of the information sought con-
69. See Corwin, The Supretne Court Construction of the Self-incriination Clause (1930)
29 M cH. L. R.. 1, 16, and cases there cited.
70. City of St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. W. 101 (1895); State v. Davis%
68 W. Va. 142, 69 S. E. 639 (1910); Fougera and Co. v. City of New York, 224 N. Y.
269, 120 N. E. 642 (1918); State v. Legora, 162 Tenn. 122, 34 S. W. (2d) 1056 (1931).
71. See 4 WIGmORE, EVIDEN c § 2259c.
72. Launder v. Chicago, 111 Ill. 291 (1884); State v. Smith, 74 Iowa 580, 38 N. W.
492 (1888); People v. Henwood, 123 Mich. 317, 82 N. W. 70 (1900); Sanning v. City
of Cincinnati, 81 Ohio St. 142, 90 N. E. 125 (1909); Aston v. State, 27 Tex. App. 574,
11 S. W. 637 (1889).
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cerns a matter which might subject him to a criminal penalty or forfeiture, he
may be privileged to withhold it by making due objection thereto in his report.7
I
Investigations whose end is the accumulation of information to serve as a
basis for an exercise of the rule-making powers of the Commission, and for the
making of recommendations for further legislation to Congress, provide the
final occasion for the exercise of the powers of investigation conferred upon the
Commission. Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act empower
the Commission to make rules and regulations relative to particular matters
stipulated in those Acts,7 4 and such other rules and regulations as are necessary
to carry out the provisions of those Acts.7  The Securities Aet directs the Com-
mission to make a study of protective and reorganization committees,70 while
the Securities Exchange Act directs it to make studies of the feasibility of segre-
gating the functions of dealers and brokers, 77 of trading in unlisted securi-
ties,78 and of the rules by which national securities exchanges regulate the con-
duct of their members.79  The results of these studies are to be reported to
Congress with recommendations for further legislation.
By Section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act, the Commission is explicitly
authorized to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which it
may deem necessary or proper to aid it in prescribing rules and regulations
under the Act, or in securing information to provide a basis for recommending
further legislation concerning matters to which the Act relates. Immediately
following the authorization to conduct investigations in those situations, the
Act provides that "for the purpose of any such investigation the Commission
or any officer designated by it may subpoena witnesses and require the pro-
duction of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records
which the commission deems relevant to the inquiry." From these statutory
provisions, the conclusion seems inescapable that Congress, at least under the
Securities Exchange Act, intended to grant powers of examination to the Com-
mission in connection with fact-finding expeditions in these situations.
There is no express statutory authorization for the exercise of the powers
of examination in these situations under the Securities Act. If such exists, it
73. Under the federal income tax laws, a taxpayer must make a return of his net
income, but if the form of the return provides for answers which the taxpayer is privileged
from making by reason of the self-incrimination clause, he may object to answering the
particular incriminating matters in his return; however, he cannot, on that ground, refuge
to make any return at all. Cf. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927); W. C.
Peacock and Co. v. Pratt, 121 Fed. 772 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903).
74. Securities Act §§ 3 (b), 7, 10 (b) (2) (3) (4), 10 (d) ; Exchange Act §§ 3 (a) (12),
3 (b), 9 (a) (6), 9 (b), 10 (a), 10 (b), 11 (a), 11 (b), 12 (b) (1), 12 (d), 12 (e),
13 (a), 13 (b), 14 (a), 15, 17, 19 (b).
75. Securities Act § 19 (a); Exchange Act § 23 (a).
76. Securities Act § 211.
77. Exchange Act § 11 (e).
78. Exchange Act § 12 (f).
79. Exchange Act § 19 (c).
[Vol. 44
COMMENTS
must be inferred from Section 19 of that Act, which empowers the Commission,
or any officer designated by it,. to subpoena witnesses and to compel the pro-
duction of books and papers for the purposes of all investigations which "are
necessary and proper for the enforcement of this title." A determination of
whether these powers may be used in fact-finding investigations of the type
under consideration hinges upon the construction which is given the word "en-
forcement." To the end of denying the Commission the powers of examina-
tion under the Securities Act in connection with its rule-making powers, or
when it is investigating protective and reorganization committees as directed
by the Act, it is arguable that the use of the word "enforcement" contemplates
the exertion of a type of compulsion by the Commission over persons who are
regulated by the Act, and does not apply to duties which are imposed upon
the Commission, since it cannot compel itself to do something. Furthermore,
if Congress had intended that the Commission should use the powers of exam-
ination in these cases, it would have expressly made provision for such, as it
has done in the Securities Exchange Act. However, such a narrow interpreta-
tion of the Section is unwarranted in view of the expressed statutory direction
to investigate protective committees for the purpose of making recommenda-
tions to Congress, and the statutory authorization to make such rules and
regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. A com-
prehensive and accurate study of protective committees was undoubtedly within
the contemplation of Congress when it directed the study. Such would be
virtually impossible without the power to subpoena witnesses and compel the
production of books and papers. And an intelligent exercise of the rule-making
power of the Commission necessarily presupposes a knowledge of all matters
concerning which rules are to be prescribed, which the Commission could hardly
gain were it dependent upon voluntary information. Furthermore, it is un-
reasonable to attach to the word "enforcement" a meaning which would lead
to the supposition that Congress conferred examining powers upon the com-
mission in respect to its rule-making powers and study of stipulated subjects
in the Securities Exchange Act, and withheld those powers from the same Com-
mission in regard to similar matters under the Securities Act.
Again, because of the immunity granted to individuals, and because of the
inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment to corporations, constitutional objection
to these powers on the ground of self-incrimination is obviated, and the only
question is the reasonableness of these provisions in the light of the Fourth
Amendment.
It may be seen that in this field of general fact-finding investigations the
courts have drawn a distinction, as to their permissibility, between so-called
private business, and business which is affected with the public interest.P
Thus, the federal courts have uniformly denied the Federal Trade Commission
the power to compel private corporations to submit to an examination of their
books and papers in a general fact-finding investigation.8' While the reason
advanced for this denial has been that the statute did not authorize the exertion
80. See Watkins, An Appraisal of the Work of the Federal Trade Commissvion (1932)
32 Cot,. L. Rnv. 272, 280.
81. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924); United
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of legal process to compel obedience to the demands of the Commission in
such a situation, there are unmistakable dicta in the cases to the effect that
the Fourth Amendment would present a barrier to such investigations of pri-
vate corporations, even though made under explicit authorization of Congress.82
Apparently, therefore, the inconvenience and hardship to private business is
deemed to be such as to outweigh any advantages derived by the public from
such investigations, and hence such investigations are unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. On the other hand, reasonableness appar-
ently draws no bounds to investigations by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission of the common carriers, which are said to be affected with the public
interest, and the Commission may generally investigate anything in that
industry.
8 3
One test of reasonableness of such investigations apparently being whether
the business investigated is affected with the public interest, there is strong
reason for upholding fact-finding investigations by the Securities Exchange
Commission. It has previously been pointed out that the regulations which
Congress has imposed upon the sale of securities in interstate commerce, and
upon the national securities exchanges, are indicative of the fact that the
business of selling and purchasing securities to the public is one which is
affected with the public interest. The abuses which surrounded the business
of dealing in securities, which necessitated the corrective legislation, bear ample
testimony to that fact.
But there are other and more cogent reasons for holding that such investi-
gations are not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
When the Commission is engaged in gathering information for the purpose
of recommending legislation to Congress relative to the purchase and sale of
securities, there is a strong analogy between such investigations and investi-
gations by a subcommittee of Congress.8 4  Since the same function is served
States v. Basic Products Co., 260 Fed. 472 (W. D. Pa. 1919); Federal Trade Comm. V.
Lorillard Co., 283 Fed. 999 (S. D. N. Y. 1922); Federal Trade Comm. v. Baltimore Grain
Co., 284 Fed. 886 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd 267 U. S. 586 (1924); Federal Trade Comm. v.
Smith, 34 F. (2d) 323 (S. D. N. Y. 1929). However, the Federal Trade Commlnion
may not be enjoined in an investigation, in view of the fact that the legal remedy of the
complainant is adequate. Federal Trade Comm. v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160
(1927); Federal Trade Comm. v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F. (2d) 873 (App. D. C. 1927);
Federal Trade Comm. v. Miller's National Federation, 47 F. (2d) 428 (App. D. C. 1931).
See Handler, supra note 30; Lilienthal, supra note 43. The Secretary of Agriculture has
been denied the power to inspect all of the books and records of the packers under the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 STAT. 168 (1921), 7 U. S. C. A. § 222 (1926), in order
to determine whether the records and books are being kept properly. Cudahy Packing
Co. v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 133 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
82. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 307 (1924); United
States v. Basic Products Co., 260 Fed. 472, 482 (W. D. Pa. 1919); Federal Trade Comm.
v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 Fed. 886, 890 (D. Md. 1922).
83. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 245 U. S. 33 (1917). This case appears,
in effect, to have overruled Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 211 U. S. 407 (1908).
Cf. Handler, supra note 30, at 932.




by the Commission and a subcommittee of Congress in such a case, no reason
appears why they should not have the same powers. It is now settled that
a witness may be compelled to testify and produce books and papers in his
possession before a subcommittee of Congress which is investigating a matter
upon which Congress may legislate.85 It would not seem unreasonable to grant
those same powers to the Commission. Since a subcommittee of Congress can
demand only such information as is relative to a matter upon which Congress
can legislate, the bounds of reasonableness to investigations by the Commission
would be that the information demanded be relative to a matter relating to
the purchase and sale of securitiei in interstate commerce, or upon the national
securities exchanges, upon which Congress may legislate. 0
Investigations by the Commission to gather data upon the basis of which the
Commission may itself prescribe rules and regulations present a situation anal-
ogous to investigations by Congress to obtain information which will enable
it intelligently to exercise its legislative duties. In such a case the Commission
is not acting as a type of congressional committee gathering information for
the purpose of recommending legislation to Congress, but is acting precisely
as Congress would, pursuant to the passage of legislation. The analogy be-
tween Congress and the Commission in such a case is a close one, for there
is little doubt that the Commission, when making rules and regulations, is
engaged in a legislative function. That that function may be denominated
"quasi-legislative" in no way detracts from the inherent legislative character
of that function. By way of comparison, it may be pointed out as well settled
that an administrative body, when engaged in quasi-judicial duties, may sub-
poena witnesses and compel the production of books and papers relative to
the inquiry 8 7 Apparently this concession has been made by the courts because
of the appreciation of the 'similarity between the administrative function in
such a case and the purely judicial function. Since courts have always been
able to subpoena witnesses and compel the production of documentary evidence,
it seemed reasonable to accord the same powers to a commission when acting
quasi-judicially. Carrying that same line of reasoning over to the situation
where a Commission acts in a quasi-legislative capacity, it would seem that
since Congress may subpoena witnesses and compel the production of books
and records in aid of its legislative powers,85 a commission acting in a manner
similar to the legislature should likewise be able to exercise those powers.
85. Jurney v. MfacCracken, 55 Sup. Ct. 375, 376 (1935). Other decisions have settled
that a person could be compelled to appear as a witness to give oral testimony before
a subcommittee of Congress, or Congress itself. In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263
(1929). See generally, Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the CongresionaI Power of
Investigation (1926) 40 HIRv. L. Rm,. 153; Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legilatlive Ir-
vestigating Committee (1933) 33 CoL.. L. Rav. 4.
86. Attack may therefore be made upon an investigation of the Securities Excbange
Commission for the purpose of recommending legislation to Congress, upon the ground
that the subject matter sought to be investigated was not within the power of Congrcss
to legislate upon. Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 16S (1880); see Herwitz and
Mulligan, supra note 85, at 8.
87. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894); Interstate Com-
merce Comm. v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25 (1904); see Lilienthal, supra note 43, at 712.
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But such investigations by the Commission may not take on an unlimited
scope. The investigatory powers of Congress have been circumscribed by the
rule of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, and the Commission, when
making rules and regulations, must similarly be limited. Neither House of
Congress is invested with a "general" power to inquire into private affairs
and compel disclosures; they may conduct inquiries only into such matters
as are relative to a subject upon which Congress may legislate. 8  Applying
that rule to the Commission, it could conduct investigations, pursuant to Its
rule-making powers, of only matters upon which it has the power to prescribe
rules and regulations.8 9 Those matters are definitely specified in both Acts,74
When the information demanded is relevant to such a matter, there is hardly
any room for objection that the investigation is unreasonable.
IV
The Securities and Exchange Commission, of course, may resort to the courts
to compel a submission to proper investigations by it.90 But this is not the
sole means available to it. The Commission may virtually compel issuers of
securities under the Securities Act to permit examinations of their books and
papers in order to check the accuracy of information in the registration state-
ment, by the power granted it to issue a stop order against the registration
statement if the issuer or underwriter shall fail to cooperate, or shall obstruct
the making of an examination.91 Under the Securities Exchange Act, the
Commission does not possess a power to issue a stop order suspending the
effectiveness of a registration upon a national securities exchange. Never-
theless, every leading securities exchange at the present time retains, as a
condition of extending the listing privilege to any corporation, the power sum-
marily to strike its securities off the exchange. 9 2  And it is not inconceivable
that many corporations will be induced to permit examination of their books
and papers to check the accuracy of statements in the application statement
or reports, by the fear that the Commission may exert pressure upon exchange
officials to exercise that power. Moreover, the threat of unfavorable publicity
for those who refuse to permit examination may prove a powerful incentive
to many persons and corporations to permit them. This is very likely to be
88. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 173 (1927).
89. Investigations undertaken by the Commission in order to gain Information upon
the basis of which it may issue rules and regulations, may not only be attacked on the
ground that the Commission does not have the statutory power to prescribe the particular
rules and regulations, but also on the grounds that such rules or regulations are beyond
the power of the Commission to make because they violate an expressed provision of
the Constitution, or because Congress could not confer upon an administrative tribunal
the power to make those rules and regulations, in view of the prohibition against the
delegation of legislative powers. Cf. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
90. Securities Act §§ 20 (c), 22 (b); Exchange Act §§ 21 (c), 21 (f).
91. Securities Act § 9 (d).
92. See, e.g., 135 C C H Stock Exchange Regulation Service 8005 (Baltimore Stock
Exchange), 8018 (Boston Stock Exchange), 8027 (Chicago Board of Trade), 8080 (Chicago
Stock Exchange), 8232 (New York Stock Exchange), 8268 (Philadelphia Stock Exchange).
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the case with active protective committees, which are now being investigated
under the Securities Act for the purpose of recommending legislation to Con-
gress, since they must acquire and keep the favor of security holders.
These latter powers may enable the Commission in many cases to secure
what information is desired without the aid of any court. Its investigatory
activity for a while may therefore proceed without incurring active protest.
Ultimately, however, its powers will be questioned, and the legality thereof
then put to test. The Commission is a new agency, administering a new
type of federal regulatory legislation. The success or failure of that regu-
lation is largely dependent upon an able discharge of the statutory duties
imposed upon the Commission. An efficient execution of those duties necessi-
tates the use of the investigatory powers which Congress has granted it.
Appeciative of this fact, the courts are unlikely to hold that the grant of these
powers is unconstitutional. Neverthless, they will hardly hesitate to interfere
with what is deemed to be an abuse of those powers.0 3 This suggests that
the Commission should proceed carefully and moderately with its investigatory
powers. That would not in any way impair its efficiency, and would assure
it greater co-operation by the courts, which is essential to its ultimate prestige
and success.
STATUTORY RIGHTS OF PRETERAiUTTED GRANDCHILDREN
FoRmEaRY, the unqualified privilege on the part of an ancestor to disinherit
his heirs could be exercised by the simple expedient of making a testamentary
gift of his estate to other persons. The only limitation which the common law
imposed upon this privilege was found in the doctrine that a subsequent marriagr
and the birth of issue was a sufficient alteration of circumstanLes to presume an
intent on testator's part to revoke the will. -The subsequent birth of a child
alone, however, was not considered sufficient.'
The legislatures of forty-six of the United States- and of a number of foreign
jurisdictions have passed statutes qualifying in various ways either the privi-
lege to disinherit or the manner in which disinheritance may be accomplished.
In some foreign jurisdictions it has been provided that a child shall have a
certain indefeasible share in his parent's estate? and in others, that, if ade-
quate provision for the maintenance of a child has not been made, the court in
93. Already one court has held that agents of the Commission exceeded their pawer
in conducting a disorderly investigation of a brokerage firm, to determine if it was -0olatin3
the Securities Exchange Act. United States v. Knight, oral opinion, reported in 135
C. C. H. Stock Exchange Regulation Service, 6553.
1. 1 Scao.LnE, Wris, ExicuoRs AD ADmmasINIS TOrS (6th ed. 1923) §§ 642, 643.
In the United States the common law is unsuperseded by statute only in Maryland, Wy-
oming and the District of Columbia.
2. All except Maryland and Wyoming.
3. See ENcycLopiA or mnr LAWS Or Scomrzzm, vol. 9, § 303. Compare the Civil
Law jurisdictions. GminrA CiriL CoDE, art. 2303; FarxCH CI CODE art. 913; L%.
CIV. CODE ANsr. (Dart, 1932) §§ 1493, 1495, 1705 and 1710.
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its discretion shall make such provision out of the testator's estate.4 These
direct limitations on the testamentary power are based on the principle that a
parent is under a social duty to provide for his immediate family in such a
way that its members shall not become a burden to the state. In the United
States, however, the legislatures have not gone so far as to limit the power of
testamentary disposition. Instead they have attempted merely to make some
provision for the cases in which a testator has unintentionally or accidentally
failed to leave an heir some part of his estate. When a will disposes all of a
testator's estate to other persons, it is, of course, possible to argue that the
express gift of the estate to them is evidence of the testator's intention to dis-
inherit his heirs. Yet in some instances it can as cogently be argued that since a
parent would usually provide for his children, his failure to do so has been
the result of fortuitous circumstances that defeated rather than carried out the
intention of the testator. Thus, when a child is born to the testator after a
will has been made, it would, in some cases, seem reasonable to assume that the
testator would subsequently desire to change his will to provide for the child.
Negligence or unexpected death may prevent the accomplishment of this change
until it is too late, and the child may consequently be left without provision
for the future. It is also barely possible that a testator may actually forget the
existence of one of his children, or may intend to make an intervivos settlement,
which is prevented by untimely death. Accordingly, the forty-six legislatures
that have acted on the question-of which twenty-four confine themselves to
children born after the execution of the will, while the others apply to all chil-
dren 5-have in general provided that in the event that a testator should fail
to care for or to mention a child in his will, the child shall take the same share
of the estate as he would have if his parent had died intestate.0 The burden
of a mistake is thus shifted from the child, whose unintentional disinheritance
would be unfortunate, to the testator, whose scheme of disposition may be par-
tially upset7 by failure to meet the formal statutory requirements for disinheri-
tance. The natural ties of love and affection and the general recognition of a
moral, as well as a legal, duty of support on the part of a parent towards a child
make such a change acceptable even though the probability that such omis-
sions are generally unintentional seemsslight.
4. See NBw Soui n WALES STAT. (1916), act no. 41, TESTATOR'S FAMILY MAINTENANCTI
AND GUARDIANSHIP OF INFrS Acr, § 1; DOm. N. Z. CONS. LAWS (1903) vol, 60, § 33,
FAMILY PROBATION Acr; VIcTORIA STAT. (1915) no. 2611, § 109, ADMINISTPATION AND
PROBATE Acr.
S. For the twenty-four statutes of the first group see notes 8 and 9, infra; for the others
see note 10, infra.
6. For a detailed analysis of the statutes with reference to their bearing upon preter-
mitted children see Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes (1929) 29 COL.
L. REv. 748. Florida since has adopted a statute, FLA. CoMp. GEN. LAWS ANIN. (Supp.
1934) § 5477(8). See also King, The Statutory Status of Pretermitted Heirs (1933) 13
B. U. L. REV. 672. See also notes 8, 9 and 10, infra.
7. The majority of the states provide that the will is only partially revoked and that
the share of the pretermitted heir is to be made up by ratable contributions from the




The majority of the statutes in this country are not confined to the protection
of pretermitted children only, but give some consideration also to grandchil-
dren who are heirs at the time of the testator's death. In eight of the twenty-
four8 states that make provision for only afterborn children, the same provisions
apply also to the issue of such deceased children,0 while in the twenty-two other
states the provision for children, regardless of when born, are likewise extended
to include the issue of deceased children. 10 A justification for shifting the
risk of mistake from these grandchildren to the testator would be that in the
normal course of events a grandparent would desire to make specific provision
for all of his grandchildren who would inherit in case he died intestate. But
actually it is questionable whether the ties are as strong between grandparents
and grandchildren as they are between parent and child, and there can scarcely
be said to be a moral or legal duty on the grandparent's part to support or
to provide for a grandchild. There is, therefore, only a very slender factual
basis for the legislative presumption that an omission of a grandchild is acci-
dental. Regardless of the circumstance that the grandchild was born after the
will, or that his parent died after the will, there is not the same reason for
protecting him as for protecting a child. Only when the testator, in his scheme
of disposition, either by means of intervivos or testamentary gifts specifically
provided for most of his grandchildren but failed to mention or provide for one
or several of them would there be any reasonable ground for the application of
such a rule, and such cases can hardly arise very often. The validity of the
presumption is also lessened by another common circumstance, that the testator
often bequeathes his property to his wife and children, so that in the normal
8. The statutes in the following sixteen states provide for only afterborn children:
AiA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 10585; ARIz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 192,3i §
3642; CoLo. aLN. STAT. (Mfills, 1930) § 7871; CoN,.N. G.N. STAT. (1930) § 48S0; DMe..
RE%. CODE (1915) § 3252; FaA. Comrs. GEN. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1934) § 5477(8); GA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 3923; ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 39, § 10;
IOWA CODE (1931) §11858; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN¢. (1923) c. 22, § 240, 243; L_%. Civ. Co.
A. (Dart, 1932) art. 1705; N. Y. Dw. EsT. L.w (1909) § 26; N. C. CODE A,:... IMichle,
1931) § 4169; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 273; S. C. CODE: (Michie, 1932)
§ 8925; TEmN. CODE (Will. Shan. & Harlow, 1932) § 8131. The other eight statutes of the
first group are cited in note 9, infra.
9. The following statutes provide for aiterborn children and their issue: I:m. STAT.
AN i. (Burns, 1926) §§ 3457, 3458; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §§ 4847, 4S4S; Miss. Couu
ANN. 1930) §§ 3551, 3552; N. J. Comp. STAT. (1911) p. 5865, §§ 20, 21; Omo Gn:;. Cor'%
(Page, Supp. 1935) § 10504-49; TF.x. ANN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 8292, szoQ;
VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) §§ 5242, 5243; W. VA. OFF. CODE (1931) c. 41, art. 4, §§ 1, 2.
10. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 10507; CAL. PnoD. CODE (Deering,
1931) § 90; IDAUO CODE AN. (1932) § 14-320; ME. R v. STAT. (1930) c. 8, § 9; M'v%';.
GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 191, § 20; MicH. CowP. LAWS (1929) § 15550; Mr;.. STAT. (.Ia:)n,
1927) § 8745; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 525; MohN'. Rnv. COD Am.;. (Choate,
1921) § 70.9; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) § 227; NEv. CO n'. L ws (Hillyer, 1930) § 91;
N. H. PuB. LAws (1925) c. 297, § 10; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 154-112; N. D.
CoNTs. LAws A"--. (1913) § 5675; OKr.A. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1931) § 1570; OMn. CODE
ANN- (1930) § 10-50S; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 298, § 22; S. D. CuMzP. Lw.xs (1929) §
636; UTA.: REv. STAT. A.NN. (1933) § 101-1-32; VT. PUB. LAws (1934) § 2977; WASn. RLv.
STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 1402; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 238.11.
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course of events it will benefit the grandchildren and eventualaly be divided
among them. In such a case an omission of a grandchild can hardly be pre-
sumed to be accidental.
Excluding from consideration the relatively infrequent occurrences of adop-
tion, illegitimacy, and posthumous birth, there are four situations in which
questions involving pretermittance of grandchildren may arise. First, both child
and grandchild may be born after the execution of the will, the child prede-
ceasing the testator. Secondly, the child may be born before and the grand-
child after the execution of the will, the child dying after the making of the
will but before the death of the testator. Thirdly, both child and grandchild
may be born prior to the execution of the will, the child dying after the making
of the will, but before the death of the testator. And finally, both child and
grandchild may be born before the date of the will, with the child in this case
dying before the execution of the will.
Except in so far as they can be included by judicial ingenuity, grandchildren
receive no consideration under the statutes of sixteen of the states in the first
group of twenty-four.8 These sixteen states confine themselves merely to the
provision that an afterborn child receives a share unless cared for by the will.
It is reasonably evident that under such a statute "afterborn child" is not in-
tended to include an afterborn grandchild. 11 At least one court has, how-
ever, advanced a line of reasoning whereby a grandchild may, under some cir-
cumstances, benefit by such a statute.12 There the testator executed his last
will in 1902, disposing of all his property to his wife. Subsequently he had
three children, one of whom predeceased the testator leaving an infant daugh-
ter. Under the New York statute providing that if a testator shall die leaving
an afterborn child uncared for by any settlement and unmentioned in the will,
the child shall succeed to an intestate share of the estate,18 the court held that
the survivorship of the child was not a necessary requisite to the operation
of the statute where the child should leave a descendant capable of taking its
parent's share by representation, and that the granddaughter was therefore
entitled to a portion of the estate equivalent to that which the deceased child
11. In re Alburger's Estate, 274 Pa. 10, 117 AtI. 450 (1922), in which the claiming
grandchild was the posthumous child of the testator's only son, and the will had been exe-
cuted after the son's death but before the grandchild's birth, held that "child" In this
type of act does not refer also to a grandchild.
12. Matter of Horst, 264 N. Y. 236, 190 N. E. 475 (1934); cf. Matter of Schuster,
III Misc. 534, 181 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1920).
13. "Whenever a testator shall have a child born after the making of a last will, either
in the lifetime or after the death of such testator, and shall die leaving such child, so
afterborn, unprovided for by any settlement, and neither provided for, nor in any way
mentioned in such will, every such child shall succeed to the same portion of such parent's
real and personal estate, as would have descended or been distributed to such child, If such
parent had died intestate." N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW (1909) § 26. The Connecticut statute,
(CoN-N. Gar. STAT. 1930) § 4880, provides: "If, after the making of a will, . . . a child
shall be born to the testator . . . and no provision shall have been made in such will for
such contingency," the birth of the child operates as a revocation of the will In toto.
On the interpretation of what constitutes a provision for such contingency, see Blake v.
Union and New Haven Trust Co., 95 Conn. 194, 110 AtI. 833 (1920).
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would have received. This analysis would, of course, be inapplicable where the
grandchild was the issue of a child born before the will was made, for the sta-
tute applies only to afterborn children; nor would it apply where no children
of the testator survived him, for then a grandchild would not take by repre-
sentation, but by his own right. Under the statutes of the other eight states
in the first group,9 which include also the issue of deceased afterborn children
in the favored class, such grandchildren would be more fully protected since
under any combination of circumstances they would, if their parent ws not pro-
vided for, receive an intestate share. Possible ambiguities in the interpretation
of these statutes with regard to the rights of grandchildren in certain contin-
gencies are relatively unimportant,' 4 for their application is confined to the
rare situation in which the birth of two generations of descendants intervenes
between the execution of the will and the death of the testator.
In contrast to the first group of statutes, which provide only for afterbom
children or their issue, the second group, existing in twenty-four states, has
found the omission of grandchildren the source of considerable litigation.10
The terms of these statutes which attempt to define which heirs shall come
within the favored class are not clear. A typical provision is that when a
"testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue
of any deceased child, ... such child, or the issue of such child,... must re-
ceive an intestate share."' 5  "Deceased child" in this context could be con-
strued to mean either a child deceased at the time the will was executed, thus
requiring a grandchild to be a presumptive heir at the time the will was made,
or it could extend to a child deceased at the time of the testator's death, but
who had been alive at the time that the will was made. The only court that
has passed on this issue held that the child must be dead at the time of the
will's execution, thus denying the application of the statute to grandchildren
in all but the fourth factual situation.16 Other courts have, by implication,
taken the opposite view. 7 The language of these statutes is sufficiently broad,
therefore, to cover a case arising in any one of the four situations in which the
rights of pretermitted grandchildren can be litigated.
After it has been determined that a grandchild is within the favored class
as defined in the local statute, the next question is whether he has been "omit-
ted." The statutory provisions differ, a number requiring that he be "'pro-
14. For example, if provision had been made for the child, would that exclude the
grandchild? And must the child have predeceased the testator?
15. O.a. STAT. AxN. (Harlow, 1931) § 1570.
16. In re Barters Estate, 86 Cal. 441, 25 Pac. 1S (1890). The testator had expresalv
excluded his daughter, who was living at the time of the will, but had not mentioned his
grandchildren. The court held that the grandchildren were not within the favored class,
not being presumptive heirs at the execution of the will
17. In Tucker v. City of Boston, 35 Mlass. 162 (1836), arising under the third situa-
tion, the grandchild was held to be a pretermitted heir, indicating that the court con-
strued the statute broadly. The issue, however, was apparently not raised. Wilder v.
Thayer, 97 Mass. 439 (1867) and Miller v. Aven, 327 Mo. 20, 34 S. W. (2d) 116 (1930)
arose in this fact situation, and although the decision was against the grandchild on other
grounds, the courts seem to have taken it for granted that the clamant was within the
terms of the statutes.
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vided for," and others that he be "named or provided for," or "provided for
or mentioned" in order that his claim to an intestate share may be avoided.0
If the grandchild has not himself been named or mentioned, where that is
necessary, and there has been no bequest directly to him, and if any other pro-
visions of the local statute remain unsatisfied, then he is considered "omitted. '18
A further provision in many of the statutes declares that an "omitted" heir may
take an intestate share unless it appears that he has been omitted intentionally.1
Even in some of the states in which this provision does not occur, so that, as a re-
suit, the terms of the statute are mandatory as to omitted heirs,20 the courts
have construed their statute in the light of its purpose so as to permit testator's
intention to have some weight. The question immediately arises, where estator's
intention is relevant, whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove it; for
otherwise the court must find it in the terms of the will and the surrounding cir-
cumstances s.2  Under the six statutes of the mandatory sort, the courts refuse
to admit such evidence. On the other hand, under the others, extrinsic evi-
dence is admissible in the states in which the question has been raised, with but
one exception.22  The determination of such issues does not, however, involve
any problems peculiar to pretermitted grandchildren.
In many instances the testator provides for or excludes his child, but neglects
to mention or provide for that child's issue. Upon the death of the child prior
to the testator, the question then arises whether the grandchild's rights, which
by the terms of the statutes are independent of his parent's, may be prejudiced
by any provision for, or disinheritance of, that parent. It is this problem which
has been the source of the greatest confusion in settling the claims of pre-
termitted grandchildren.
Where a grandparent has actually made a substantial provision for a child
it would be normal for him to consider it as provision for that child's family
and expect that his grandchildren would derive benefit therefrom. Recognizing
this fact, but being restricted often by the terms of the statute, the courts could
seize upon the fact that such a gift, in the event of the child's predeceasing the
18. Cf. Branton v. Branton, 23 Ark. 569 (1861) ; In re Van Wyck's Estate, 185 Cal. 49,
196 Pac. 50 (1928) ; In re Thomas' Estate, 92 Cal. App. 185, 267 Pac. 897 (1928); Tucker
v. City of Boston, 35 Mass. 102 (1836) ; Roots v. Knox, 107 Ore. 96, 212 Pac. 469 (1923).
But cf. Brown v. Brown, 71 Neb. 200, 98 N. W. 618 (1904); Merrill v. Sanborn, 2 N. H.
499 (1822).
19. Of the statutes cited in note 10, supra, the following are contingent upon the inten-
tion of the testator: California, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont and Wisconsin.
20. Of the statutes cited in note 10, supra, the following are of the mandatory type:
Arkansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington.
21. Under the first group of statutes, when an omitted child's birth occurs after the
execution of the will, evidence of extrinsic circumstances would generally be inadmissible
to show the intention of the testator. See Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills (1929)
14 IowA L. Rzv. 172, 174-177.
22. See Mathews, supra note 6, at 773, n. 92. The California statute is peculiar in that
it gives a statutory share to an omitted heir "unless it appears from the will that such




testator, goes by operation of the antilapse statutes2 to his heirs and hold
either that the grandchild's receipt of the legacy was a "provision" for the grand-
child, or that the testator knew of the effect of the statute, and hence intention-
ally made no other provision for the grandchild. The grandchild, although he
is not a legatee specifically provided for in the will, actually receives a sub-
stantial part of the estate of his grandparent, and therefore there is no reason
for allowing him an intestate share. Moreover, when the testator makes a
substantial gift to a child who he knows is dead at the time, the only possible
reason for such a gift would be an intention to provide for the child's family,
which would indicate that the omission of the grandchild was intentional.
The testator may, on the other hand, disinherit one or more of his children.
This may be effected by means of making a nominal bequest, or by mentioningv
the name of the child to be excluded, or, under some of the statutes, by an
express proviso to that effect. An expression of the testator's intention in
this respect, however, gives no very definite clue as to his intention toward
that child's family, but it would tend to show that he intended to exclude them.
In the states in which the testator's intention is the final test, it would seem
reasonable that a court, recognizing that the testator in making a nominal
bequest to his son in all probability had intended to exclude the grandchildren,
should hold that a receipt by them of the nominal gift made to their parent
satisfied the technical formula of the statute.2 4 Where the child was dead at
the date of the execution of the will and the testator had knowledge of the
existence of the child's issue, a nominal gift to the child would seem to be in-
tended to pass to the grandchildren and to exclude them, so that, therefore,
they should not take an intestate share.25 In a case in which, for some
reason, the nominal gift to the parent failed to go to the grandchild, the court
could reach the same result by holding realistically that the disinheritance of
the child was intended as an exclusion of his family as well.20 A proviso ex-
pressly disinheriting a child could be treated similarly; and since a mere men-
tion of his name, although having less evidentiary value of an intent to dis-
inherit the child, has that effect, it should not produce a different result r
23. These statutes prevent a gift to a person who is dead from being void and transfer
the gift to the heirs of the legatee. See Mechem, Same Problems Arising Under Anti-
lapse Statutes (1933) 19 IoWA L. Rxv. 1, 13-15.
24. Cf. Lawnick v. Shultz, 325 Mo. 294, 28 S. W. (2d) 6S8 (1930); Miller v. Aven,
327 Mo. 20, 34 S. W. (2d) 116 (1930).
25. In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. (2d) 230 (1931) (legacy of ten dollars to
a son whom testator knew to be deceased was held to raise an inference that he intended
to disinherit the omitted grandchild also); cf. Riley v. Collier, 111 0kla. 130, 238 Pac. 491
(1925) (gift of fifty dollars to a child legally deceased, held to raise no inference that tes-
tator had in mind grandchildren of whose existence he was conceivably unaware, and hence
they were permitted to share.
26. Wilder v. Thayer, 97 Mass. 439 (1867), held that a life annuity for the prede-
ceased child sufficiently indicated the testator's intention to provide for his grandchild,
of whose existence he was aware. Two California cases refused to infer an intent to ex-
dude the grandchild. In re Ross' Estate, 140 Cal. 282, 73 Pac. 976 (1930); In re Matthevws'
Estate, 176 Cal. 576, 169 Pac. 233 (1917) (gift to deceased person held void).
27. In In re Salmon's Estate, 107 Cal. 614, 40 Pac. 1030 (1895), and Myers v. W'atssn,
234 Mo. 286, 136 S. W. 236 (1911), a mention of the deceased child by a provision for his
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In some of the states in which the statutes are mandatory with regard to
grandchildren who are not mentioned or provided for in the will, the courts
are not expressly permitted to consider the testator's intention unless expressed
in the manner the statutes prescribe. It is to be expected, therefore, that
they would decide differently from the courts in the former group. Where a
nominal gift to a child goes to the grandchildren, however, they are able to
uphold the will by adopting the reasoning that the grandchild is technically
provided for, and therefore is not pretermitted. 28  Neither a gift to a deceased
child, where no lapse statute gave it to the grandchild, nor a mention of the
deceased child could be permitted under this type of statute to raise an in-
ference of the testator's intention which would have any weight in the decision
unless the court was willing to construe its statute in accordance with the un-
derlying policy that it merely creates a presumption of mistaken omission.20
The general protection which these statutes afford to heirs of a testator does
not work out equitably or with any reasonable relation to the social values
to be derived from such a policy. Actually, it is largely a matter of chance
whether an heir who is omitted may recover. If he does, his share has no
relation whatsoever to the fact that he may be a minor or an invalid needing
support, or that others in his family were cared for by the will. Moreover, as
each of the legatees are required by the statutes to contribute ratably to his
share, whenever a gift has been made to a person outside the immediate family,
the omitted heir takes a disproportionate share, often much larger than that
of an heir whom the testator had particular reason to remember in his will.
When the omitted heir is a grandchild, such inequalities are intensified.
surviving spouse was held not to affect the rights of omitted grandchildren to take as
pretermitted heirs. In Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 34 Pac. 513 (1893), the court, In
order to avoid pretermission, construed a clause excluding all testator's "children" to Include
grandchildren as well.
28. Lawnick v. Schultz, 325 Mo. 294, 28 S. W. (2d) 658 (1930); Miller v. Aven, 327
Mo. 20, 34 S. W. (2d) 116 (1930) (great-grandchildren). In both cases the heir took a
five dollar bequest to the deceased child by reason of the lapse statute.
29. See Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408 (1853), in which the court intimated that knowl-
edge of the existence of testator's grandchild and mention of her mother's name in the will
indicated that she was in testator's mind and was not pretermitted. The court, however,
gave the granddaughter a share in a residuary legacy for all testator's children, in spite of
his knowledge of the death of his daughter. In Fugate v. Allen, 119 Mo. App. 183, 95
S. W. 980 (1906), in which the plaintiff bears the double relation of adopted son and
grandson of testator and is seeking contribution from his mother and two aunts, who
are all alive, it was held that though omitted, the mention of his mother indicated that
the testator had not forgotten this plaintiff, following Guitar v. Gordon, supra. But cf.
Gray v. Parks, 94 Ark. 39, 125 S. W. 1023 (1910), holding for the grandchild where hia
parent was mentioned and given a nominal gift, under a peculiar statute which requires
heirs to be mentioned and is silent concerning the effect of a provision for them.
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NATIONAL RECOVERY CODE ASSESSMENTS
THE wholesale governmental regulation of industry created by NTIRA'
necessarily involved a complex administrative organization with enormous at-
tendant expenses which, exclusive of those incurred and assumed directly by
the government in its supervisory capacity, have been estimated to aggregate
over forty million dollars a year.2 Yet, curiously enough, the Act itself did
not establish the essential agencies and omitted any mention of a method for
defraying their necessary expenses. Since the fundamental concept of NRA,
formulated in self-imposed Codes of fair competition, was that of industrial
democracy in partnership with and under the control of the government, the
idea easily developed that details of enforcement and administration should
be placed in the hands of bodies chosen by and representative of industry-the
code authorities. It seemed only fair that the inevitable expenses of main-
taining these code authorities in the performance of their various legitimate
regulatory functions provided by the codes should be borne by each member
of the industry represented by the authority in proportion to the benefits
derived by the member from its activities. In this way there was developed
the principle that the costs of code administration, which would necessarily
vary ivith the regulatory needs of each industry, should be met by assessments
levied by the code authorities against those falling under their jurisdiction.
Thus the earlier codes made payment of such an assessment a condition pre-
cedent to the enjoyment of the benefits offered, such as use of the NRA in-
signia, participation in the election and activities of the code authority, and
sharing the advantages of compulsory arbitration provisions.? Or under codes
which in effect delegated the administrative work to a pre-existing trade asso-
ciation, a member of the industry became entitled to enjoy the benefits offered
by the code either upon undertaking membership in the association, to which
it was provided that no inequitable restrictions should be attached, or upon
paying such proportion of dues, assessments, or other charges as was used to
1. National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195, 15 U. S. C. A. § 701 (1933).
2. NRA Release No. 9957, Feb. 5, 1935.
3. Code of Fair Competition for the Advertising Distributing Trade, art. IV, § 6; All-Metal
Insect Screen, art. VI, § 7; Asphalt Shingle and Roofing Manufacturing, art. VI, § 2 (b);
Barber Shop, art. VI, § 5; Blouse and Skirt Manufacturing, art. V, § 1 (e); Boiler Manu-
facturing, art. VIII, § 1; Smelting and Refining of Secondary Metals into Bras and Bronze
Alloys in Ingot Form, art. VI, § 5; Can Manufacturers, art. VI, § 3; Carpft and Rug
Manufacturing, art. VI, § 4; Chemical Manufacturing, art. VI; Cinders, Ashes and Scaven-
gers, art. VI, § 7; Cotton Garment, art. LX, G; Fur Trapping Contractors, art. 1,, § 4;
Gas Appliances and Apparatus, art. VII, § 2; Gasoline Pump Manufacturing, art. XI; In-
fants' and Children's Wear, art. VII, § 5; Laundry and Dry Cleaning Machinery Manufactur-
ing, art. VIII; Machinery and Allied Products, art. NI (d) par. 3; American Match, art VI.
§ 1 (d); Motor Vehicle Storage and Parking, div. C, § 2; Non-Ferrous Foundr, art. VII
(c); Office Equipment Manufacturers, § 18, par. 4; Optical Manufacturing, art. VIII;
American Petroleum Equipment, art. I, § 3; Plumbago Crucible, art. VII; Radio Broad-
casting, art. VI, § S; Rayon and Synthetic Yarn Producing, art. VIII, § 4; Shoe Rebuild-
ing, art. VI, § § 4, 6 (j); Stock Exchange Firms, schedule B, § 8; Upholstery and Drapary
Textile, art. VI, § § 7, 8; 'itrified Clay Sewer Pipe Manufacturing, art. VI, § 10; Wall
Paper Manufacturing, art. XII.
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defray the costs of code administration. 4  Under either of these two types of
provisions each member of the industry, upon payment of his proportionate
share of the expense, became entitled to the benefits offered. Other codes
made payment an obligation of all those signing or in any other manner assent-
ing to the particular code. But soon it became evident that considerations
of fairness dictated that, since all members of an industry were necessarily
deriving benefits from the code regardless of participation, assessments should
be made on a compulsory, rather than a voluntary, basis. And so the recent
codes and those which have been amended in conformity with a model pro-
vision 6 approved by executive order of the President7 contemplate compulsory
4. Advertising Specialty Manufacturing, art. VI; Cap and Closure, art. IV, § 3 (b);
Cement, art. IV, B, § 8; Chemical Manufacturing, art. VI; Coated Abrasives, art. VII, § 3,
par. 2; Compressed Air, art. X; Electrical Manufacturing, art. VII; Floor and Wall Clay
Tile Manufacturing, art. VI, B, § 9; Glass Container, art. IV, § 2 (b); Heat Exchange, art.
X; Knitting, Braiding, and Wire Covering Machine, art. III; Laundry, art. VI, § 4; Ma.
chine, Tool and Forging Machinery, art. VI (d); Metal Tank, art. VI (c); Paint, Varnish,
and Lacquer Manufacturing, art. X, par. 7; Piano Manufacturing, art. VI, § I (d); Pump
Manufacturing, art. X; Rubber Manufacturing, art. II, § 5; Rubber Tire Manufacturing,
art. II, § 5; Salt Producing, art. 2; Silverware Manufacturing, art. VII, § 3; Toy and Play.
things, art. VI, § 3 (b); Umbrella Manufacturing, art. VII, § 4; Valve and Fittings Manu-
facturing, art. VI, § 1 (2).
5. Asbestos, art. VI, § 1 (h); Cleaning & Dyeing, art. VI, § 3 (i); Fertilizer, art. XI;
Fishery, art. VIII, tit. E; Gas Appliances and Apparatus, art. VIII, § 2; Household Goods
Storage and Moving, art. VI, § 2 (g); Investment Bankers, art. X, § 13; Lime, art. V, §
2 (b), par. 2; Luggage and Fancy Leather Goods, art. VII, § 1; Malleable Iron, art. IV, §
2; Motion Picture, art. II, § 10 (b) ; Motor Bus, art. VI, § 2 (g) ; Newsprint, art. II, § 2;
Non-Ferrous Foundry, art. VII (c); Paperboard Manufacturing, art. II, § 3; Paper Making
Machine Builders', art. VI, § 5; Paper Stationery and Tablet Manufacturing, art. II, § 5;
Refractories, art. III; Special Tool, Die, and Machine Shop, art. VI, § 1 (b); Steel Casting,
art. IV, § 2; Stock Exchange Firms, schedule B, § 8; Velvet, art. VI, § 6.
6. "1. It being found necessary, in order to support the administration of this Code and to
maintain the standards of fair competition established by this Code and to effectuate the
policy of the Act, the Code Authority is authorized, subject to the approval of the Ad-
ministrator:
"(a) To incur such reasonable obligations as are necessary and proper for the fore-
going purposes and to meet such obligations out of funds which may be raised as herein.
after provided and which shall be held in trust for the purposes of the code;
"(b) To submit to the Administrator for his approval, subject to such notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard as he may deem necessary, (1) an itemized budget of its estimated ex.
penses for the foregoing purposes, and (2) an equitable basis upon which the funds neces.
sary to support such budget shall be contributed by members of the Industry;
"(c) After such budget and basis of contribution have been approved by the Adminis-
trator, to determine and secure equitable contributions as above set forth by all such mem-
bers of the Industry, and to that end, if necessary, to institute legal proceedings therefor In
its own name.
"2. Only members of the Industry complying with the Code and contributing to the
expenses of its administration as provided in Section 1 hereof shall be entitled to partlcpate
in the selection of the members of the Code Authority or to receive the benefit of its volun-
tary activities or to make use of any emblem or insignia of the National Recovery Ad.
ministration."
7. Executive order of April 14, 1934, 2 NRA Rep. 146.
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assessments against all members of an industry without regard to assent or
equivalent conduct.8
S. These code provisions are based on the model quoted in note 6, supra: Air Transport,
art. VI, § 6 (f); Artificial Flower and Feather, art. VI, § 7 (f); Asphalt and Mastic Tile,
a t. VI, § 1 (g); Auction and Loose Leaf Tobacco Warehouse, art. VI, § 1 (e); Automatic
Sprinkler, art. VIII; Automobile Parts and Equipment Manufacturing, art. VI, B; Baking,
art. VI, § 4 (f); Boot and Shoe, art. VII; Bottled Soft Drink, art. VI, § S (h); Brew-
ing, art. VIII, § 4 (c-e); Buff and Polishing Wheel, art. VI, § 1 (b); Buffing and Polishing
Composition, art. VI, § 1 (b); Dealers in Builders Supplies Submitted by the National
YFederation of Builders Supply Associations, art. VII; Business Furniture, Storage Equipment,
and Filing Supply, art. I'V, par. 4; Can Manufacturers, art. VI, § 3; Candy Manufacturing.
art. VI, § 9 (f); Canning, art. VI, § 5 (f); Canning and Packing Machinery and Equip-
ment, art. VII, § 2 (f) ; Cast Iron Soil Pipe, § 8; Coat & Suit, art. VI, § 2, H; Cigar Manu-
facturing, art. VIII, § 7 (f) ; Commercial and Breeder Hatchery, art. VII, § 1 (e-g); Com-
-mercial Refrigerator, art. VI, § 9 (i), § § 10, 11; Concrete Masonry, art. VI, § 14; Cotton
Cloth Glove Manufacturing, art. VI, § § 4-6; Country Grain Elevators, art. VI, A, § 11;
-Crushed Stone, Sand and Gravel, and Slag, art. VI, § 5 (a) (11); Dry and Polishing Mop
-Aanufacturing, art. VI, § 2 (d); Electric Storage and Wet Primary Battery, art. VI, § 3;
Electrotyping and Stereotyping, art. VII, § 5; End Grain Strip Wood Block, art. VI, § 9 (f);
Excelsior and Excelsior Products, art. VI, § 1 (f); Fabricated Metal Products% etc., art. IV,
§ 7; Feed Mlanufacturing, art. VI, § 5; Fire Extinguishing Appliance Manufacturing, art.
"VI, § 2 (h); Fishing Tackle, art. IV, § 6; Folding Paper Box, art. II, § 5; Funeral Supply,
art. VII, § 6; Fur Dressing and Fur Dyeing, art. VI, § 8 (b); Furniture Manufacturing,
art. VI, § § 5-7; Gas Cock, art. XVIII; Graphic Arts, art. I, § 3 (e) 1-3; Gray Iron Foun-
-dry, art. III, § 4; Grinding Wheel, art. VII, § 1 (f); Hair and jute Felt, art. VI (c); Hair
Cloth Manufacturing, art. VI, § 4; Handkerchief, art. VI, § 5 (1); Hardwood Distillation.
art. VI, A, § 2; Ice, art. X, § 5; Imported Date Packing, art. VI, part B, § 1 (1); Indus-
trial Supplies and Machinery Distributors' Trade, art. V, § § 2-4; Knitted Outerwear, art
IX (f); American Lace Manufacturing, art. VIII; Ladder Manufacturing, art. II, B;
Leather and Woolen Knit Glove, art. VI, § § 5-7; Liquefied Gas, art. V, § 5; Luggage and
Fancy Leather Goods, art. VII, § 2; Lumber and Timber Products, art. IV (b-d); Mla-
chine Tool and Equipment Distributing, art. V, § 5; Marking Devices, art. VI, § 5; Medium
and Low Priced jewelry Manufacturing, art. VII, § § 6-9; Metal Tank, art. Vl, § § 3-5;
1Millinery, art. VI, § 13 (1); Millinery and Dress Trimming, Braid, and Textile, art. VI (a)
(5) ; Mopstick, art. VI, § 2 (e); Motor Fire Apparatus Manufacturing, art. VI, § 4; Mo-
tion Picture, art. II, § 10 (b); Motor Vehicle Retailing, art. VI, B, § § 4-6; Needle Work
in Puerto Rico, art. VII, § 8 (1); Oil Burner, art II; Oxy-acetylene, art. VI, § 6; Pad aing
Machinery, art. X, § 3; Paper Distributing, art. IV, § 4; Photo-Engraving, art. VII, § 7
(f); Photographic and Photo Finishing, art. VI, § 6, G; Pipe Nipple Manufacturing, art.
"VI, § 8; Plastering and Lathing Contracting, art. IV, § § 5-7; Precious Jewelry Producing
art. VII, § § 5-8; Printer's Roller, art. II, § 6; Pulp and Paper, art. II, § 4; Pyrotechnic
Manufacturing, art. VI, § 4 (b); Raw Peanut Milling art. X, § § 2-4; Reinforcing Iaterls
-Fabricating, art. V, § § 9-11; Retail, art. X, § 2 (f); Retail Farm Equipment, art. IV (c);
Retail Food and Grocery, art. X, § 1 (f); Retail jewelry, art. DC, § 2 (f); Retail Lum-
-her, Lumber Products, Building Materials, and Building Specialties, art. rII, § 7, pars. 4, s;
Retail Rubber Tire and Battery, art. II, A, § 7 (m); Retail Solid Fuel, art. I, § § 23-26;
Retail Tobacco, art. Viii, § 7 (f); Road Machinery Manufacturing, art. III, § 2; Roe:
Crusher Manufacturing, art. III; Rolling Steel Door, art. VI, § 9 (e); Saddlery MIanufac-
-turing, art. VI, § 3; Savings, Building and Loan Associations, art. V1, § § 4-6; Sdentific
Apparatus, art. VI, § 7; Set-up Paper Box Manufacturing, art. II, § 5; Shoe and Leather
Finish, Polish and Cement Manufacturing, art. VI, § 7; Shovel, Dragline, and Crane, art.
vI, § 1 (c); Silk Textile, art. VI, § 4; Silverware Manufacturing, art. 17II, § 2 (g); Soap
1935]
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Under existing administrative orders and practice a valid assessment can
be made only after the code authority has secured from the Administratoro-
now the NIRB' 0-- approval of an itemized budget and a basis of contribution.
The expenses presumably are to be only those necessary and proper to the
legitimate administration of the code provisions, which define in each case the
powers and the scope of activities of the code authorities. But the codes do
not impose any definite limitation on amount of expenses, nor do they place
any particular restrictions on budget items. The actual costs of their activities
are left to the determination of the code authorities as matters of business
discretion," subject, of course, to the approval of the NIRB. Similarly, most
codes provide no specific basis of assessment, requiring only that it be fair
and equitable. Some, however, ordain that the levy shall be made on the
basis of some particular item "and/or such other factors as may be deemed
equitable to be taken into consideration."' 2  Only a very few absolutely pre-
and Glycerine Manufacturing, art. VI, C-E; Steel Tubular and Firebox Boiler, art. VI, 9 7;
Stone Finishing Machinery and Equipment, art. VI, § § 8-10; Structural Clay Products, art.
X (a-c); Textile Machinery Manufacturing, art. III; Trucking, art. III, B, § § 4-6; Warm
Air Furnace Manufacturing, art. V, § 2 (c); Washing and Ironing Machinery Manufactur-
ing, art. VI, B; Watch Case Manufacturing, art. VI, § 1 (e); Waterproofing, etc., art. VI,
§ 4; Waxed Paper, art. 1I, § 5; Wheat Flour Milling, art. VI, § 1 (f-g); Wholesale Automo.
five, art. VIII (H); Wholesale Food and Grocery, art. VIII, § 1 (f); Wholesale Fresh Fruit
and Vegetable Distributive, art. VI, § 1 (5-8); Wholesaling or Distributing, art. VI, § 4;
Women's Belt, art. VIII; Wood Plug, art. VI, § 2 (e); Wool Felt Manufacturing, art. VI,
§ § 8-10.
The following code provisions contemplate assessments against code dissenters, but are not
based on the model: Anti-Hog-Cholera Serum and Hog-Cholera Virus, art. VI, § 2 (b);
Beet Sugar, art IX (c); Bowling and Billard Operating, art. VI, § 7 (f); Labor Provisions
for the Brewing Industry, art. VI, B, § 8; Cast Iron Pressure Pipe, art. VI, § 8; Bituminous
Coal, art. VII, § 3 (h) ; Construction, art. IV, A, § 2 (d); Corset and Brassiere, art VIII (e) ;
Grain Exchanges and Members Thereof, art. VI, § I (f); Hosiery, art. IX, § 4; Linseed Oil
Manufacturing, art. X, § 4; Men's Clothing, art. XIII (e), par. 5; Motion-Picture Labora-
tory, art. III, § 4; Petroleum, art. VII, § 8; Rayon and Silk Dyeing and Printing, art. VIII,
§ 4; Underwear and Allied Products Manufacturing, Part IV, § 1 (h); Wool Textile, art,
VI, par. 2.
9. Administrative Order No. X-36, May 26, 1934.
10. Executive Order No. 6859, Sept. 27, 1934.
11. See page 861, infra.
12. Advertising Distributing, art. IV, § 6; All-Metal Insect Screen, art. VI, § 7; Asphalt
Shingle and Roofing Manufacturing, art. VI, § 2 (b); Barber Shop, art. VI, 5; Blouse
and Skirt Manufacturing, art. V, § 1 (e); Boiler Manufacturing, art. VIII, § 1; Smelting
and Refining of Secondary Metals into Brass and Bronze Alloys ia Ingot Form, art. VI, §
5; Can Manufacturers, art. VI, § 3; Cement, art. IV, B, § 8; Chemical Manufacturing, art,
VI; Cleaning & Dyeing, art. VI, § 3 (i); Cotton Garment, art. IX, G; Floor and Wall Clay"
Tile Manufacturing, art. VI, B, § 9; Fur Trapping Contractors, art. IV, § 4; Gas Appli
ances and Apparatus, art. VII, § 2; Infants and Children's Wear, art. VII, § 5; Laundry,
art. VI, § 4; Luggage and Fancy Leather Goods, art. VII, § 2; Lumber & Timber Products,
art. IV (b); American Match, art. VI, § 1 (d); Non-Ferrous Foundry, art. VII (c); Paint,
Varnish, and Lacquer Manufacturing, art. X, par. 7; American Petroleum Equipment, art,
I, § 3; Plumbago Crucible, art. VII; Radio Broadcasting, art. VI, § 8; Rayon and Syn-
thetic Yarn Producing, art. VIII, § 4; Special Tool, Die, and Machine Shop, art. VI, § I
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scribe the basis to be used. 3 Thus a rather wide range of discretion is vested
in the code authority not only in determining the amount of expenditure but
also in choosing a basis of assessment answering the peculiar needs of the
industry subject to its jurisdiction. They may utilize such bases as: unit
volume of sales, dollar volume of sales, volume of raw material consumed,
units of productive machinery in use, dollar volume of pay-roll, number of
productive employes, number of man-hours worked, base charge per plant
operated, average number of all employes on the pay-rolls of industry members,
or a fixed amount per employe per annum.14 Which of these diverse methods
meet the requirement of being "fair and equitable" will depend, of course,
largely upon the individual characteristics of a given industry. The only re-
strictions on the exercise of discretion by the code authority in choosing a
basis of contribution which have been imposed by the NIRB as conditions
of its approval of the basis are that it must conform with the code, be equitable
in operation, and properly related to the budget.
Clearly, those who have assented voluntarily to the codes are bound by their
agreement to pay authorized code costs.' r Only those members of an industry
-who have refused to sign the code and have avoided direct participation in
code authority activities and possibly those who have signed under economic
duress are in a position to contest the intrinsic validity of the power to impose
and collect assessments. With respect to them, at least the assessment is the
exercise of a general governmental function, such as must give assurance of
due process and equal protection. But it is to the interest of all classes of
enterprisers to eliminate unauthorized or excessive expenses and inequities and
improprieties arising from the manner of assessment. The assessment of code
costs, therefore, even if desirable and valid, should provide adequate safeguards
against abuses such as racketeering and incompetence. Yet, on the other hand,
consideration of these requirements must be tempered by the danger of sacri-
ficing administrative efficiency.16
At the outset arises the objection that NIRA does not authorize assessments.
They are not mentioned in the Act and even code authorities receive no specific
recognition there. Of course this can readily be remedied on revision by express
authorization to code authorities to impose and collect assessments. But until
this is done the inference must be sought in the NIRA that some such admin-
istrative agencies must have been within the contemplation of Congress. This
(b) ; Upholstery and Drapery Textile, art. VI, § § 7, 8; Vitrified Clay Sewver Pipe- Branu-
facturing, art. VI, § 10; Wall Paper Manufacturing, art. XII.
13. Cap and Closure, art. IV, § 3 (b) (net sales); Bituminous Coal, art. VII, § 3 (h)
(tonnage) ; Concrete Pipe Manufacturing, art. IV, § 10, A (tonnage produced); Fishery,
art. VIII, tit. E, § 1 (sales); Glass Container, art. IV, § 2 (b) (net sales); Malleable Iron,
art. IV, § 2 (net tons shipped) ; Rayon and Silk Dyeing and Printing, art. VIII, § 4; (pay-
Toll); Silk Textile, art. VI, § 4; Valve and Fittings Manufacturing, art. VI, § 1 (2); Vel-
-vet, art. VI, § 6 (wages); Wool Felt Manufacturing, art. VI, § 3 (labor employed).
14. NRA Release No. 4754, May 1, 1934.
15. The fact of signing an assent to the code may not, however, amount to a true vol-
untary assent, in view of coercion, threat of boycott, etc. Other difficulties are also preznt.
See Comment (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1394; Comment (1933) 47 HAnv. L. Rav. 85, lID.
16. Administrative Order No. X-36, May 26, 1934 .
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inference may be drawn from the expressed Congressional intention that the
President redelegate many of the powers delegated to him.'1 Congress could
scarcely have failed to recognize that the agencies to whom the President must
necessarily delegate power would inevitably incur expenses; yet it made no
appropriation of public monies to defray them. The conclusion is warranted,
therefore, that it was intended that the code authorities should themselves
raise the necessary funds; and it is corroborated to some extent by the fact
that similar assessments had been considered the best practice in financing the
operations of trade associations,' 8 whose activities clearly served as the Con-
gressional model. Authority for code assessments may also be implied from
Section 3 of the Act, which provides for definition in the codes of the standards.
of fair competition. It would appear that a member of the industry who
receives the benefits of the activities of the code authority or other similar
body at the expense of his competitors is deriving an unfair competitive ad-
vantage from his refusal to pay the assessment. And the code provisions
empowering the code authorities to impose and collect assessments could there-
fore be said to be an exercise of the defining power delegated by Section 3.
Although it is thus possible to imply authority from the Act,19 the necessity
of such resort which leaves the question open to the possible vagaries of judi-
cial imagination emphasizes the need to remove the vulnerable uncertainty
by including in the new legislation provisions expressly recognizing code author-
ities and calling for the mandatory levying of assessments by them.20
If the. assessment provisions are expressly authorized by the new law or
can be regarded as impliedly authorized by the present Act, it may still be
urged that they are unconstitutional because not within the powers of Congress.
But if the Act, and the codes formulated under it, constitute a valid regulation
of interstate commerce, 2' this objection can readily be met, for the power to
compel the payment of code assessments is necessary and proper to that
17. Sections 2(a), 2(b), and 3(a), 48 STAT. 195, 196, 15 U. S. C. A. § § 702 (a), 702 (b),
703 (a) (1933) ; Comment (1934) 2 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 436, 441.
18. DONALD, TRADE AssocrATioNs (1933) 126-133; For, TRADE AssocLAnoNs (1930)
70-74.
19. Schlesinger v. Kofsky-Moos, Inc., U. S. L. Week, Jan. 8, 1935, at 424, col. I (N. Y.
Mun. Ct. 1934). But cf. Friedman v. John Lowry, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 5, 1935, at 83,
col. 3 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935). These cases, reaching opposite results, arose under the New
York Recovery Act rather than under the NIRA, but there is no distinction in principle be-
tween the powers to be implied from the State and Federal Acts.
20. It is noteworthy that the revisors are planning such a proposal. N. Y. Times, Feb.
24, 1935, at 5, col. 3.
21. The constitutionality of the Act and its purposes is assumed in this comment; only
those constitutional problems involving the levy and collection of code assessments are con-
sidered. For discussions of the more general problem, consult Black, The National Indus.
trial Recovery Act and the Delegation of Legislative Power to the President (1934) 19
Consm. L. Q. 389; Field, Constitutional Theory of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(1934) 18 MINN. L. REV. 269; Carpenter, Constitutionality of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1934) 7 So. CAI.Iw, L. REV. 125. In Cou-
sens, The Delegation of Federal Legislative Power to Executive Officials (1935) 33 Mxcu.
L. REv. 512, an attempt is made to appraise the significance of the recent case of Panama Re-
fining Co. v. Ryan, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935), infra note 34.
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regulation.22 The necessity of raising funds to pay the expenses of the regu-
lation is patent. And the propriety of raising them chiefly from those con-
-cerned by the regulation is established by precedent as an appropriate means
of accomplishing the legitimate legislative end. Thus collection of the costs
,of administering a law from those for or against whom it is administered has
received judicial sanction in a variety of circumstances. License fees -3 and
inspection fees24 are the usual forms, but others have enjoyed equal favor in
the courts.2 The underlying principles dictating these decisions, and meeting
the objection that they are violative of due process, are that it is only fair
that those who receive the benefits of the law should bear its burdens,2 that
the levy is in the nature of a contribution for services rendered,-- or that it
responds to the dictates of justice to require those whose activities necessitate
regulation in the public interest to pay the cost of that regulation. -S Possibly,
too, if it may be urged that Congress has what amounts to a police power
over interstate commerce,2 9 then the assessment of code costs, like similar state
22. Its constitutional authorization is, therefore, that of the so-called "elastic clause",
U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, par. 18.
23. Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (1884); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 505
(1911); Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 623 (1915); Kane v. State of New
Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 168 (1916); American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. City of Phila-
delphia, 312 Pa. 311, 167 AUt. 891 (1933).
24. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 (1877); Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423
(1879); Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (18S6); Nash-
ville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 101 (1888); Patapeco Guano
Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345 (1898); St. Louis Consolidated
,Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 207 (1902); McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande Rr. Co.,
203 U. S. 38, 54 (1906); Red "C" Oil Manufacturing Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380
(1912); Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540 (1912); People v. Harper, 91
11. 357, 369 (1878); Chicago, Wilmington and Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 181 I11. 270,
54 N. E. 961 (1899) ; City of New Orleans v. Hop Lee, 104 La. 601, 29 So. 214 (1901) ; Mer-
chants Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 635, 111 S. W. 568, 569 (19Z3); City
Council of Charleston v. Rogers, 2 McCord 495, 499 (S. C. 1823).
25. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 314 (U. S.
1851) (pilot-fees); Charlotte, Columbia and Augusta Rr. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 394
(1892) ("contributions"); New York v. Squire, 145 U. S. 175, 191 (1892) (ass-',ments);
St. Mary's Franco-American Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia, 203 U. S. 183 (1905) (charges
for services rendered); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911) (a-L-ments);
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 528 (1912) (stamps); Carpenter v. State Bar of California
211 Cal. 358, 295 Pac. 23 (1931) (dues); State ex rel. Macey v. Johnson, So Idaho 363, 296
Pac. 588 (1931) (charges for services rendered); Harrison v. the Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 1 Gill 264 (Md. 1843).
26. People v. Harper, 91 Ill. 357, 369 (1878); Merchants Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott,
212 Mo. 616, 635, il S. W. 565, 569 (1908).
27. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 314 (U. S.
1851); Chicago, Wilmington and Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 181 Ill. 270, 275, 54 N. E.
961, 962 (1899) ; City Council of Charleston v. Rogers, 2 McCord 495, 499 (S. C. 1823).
28. Charlotte, Columbia and Augusta Rr. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 394 (1892);
Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, 206 Wis. 589, 240 N. W.
411 (1932).
29. See, especially, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 524 (1934); cf. Cushman, The
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exactions,30 might be held referable to that power and to constitute a valid
exercise of it. Cases involving special assessments for local improvements like-
wise afford a possible analogy. Such assessments are now almost uniformly
held valid; 3 ' they are founded on the principle, which seems equally applicable
to assessment of code costs, that although the improvement in question may
be beneficial to the public, it has also given special value to certain property
which may be assessed against the property so benefited . 2  Here the regu-
lation has given that special value to those subject to the code.83
But the most serious threat to the validity of the code assessments lies in
an attack based upon the claim that delegation of the power to the code
authorities not only to make the assessments but also to prescribe the methods
of making them is unwarranted. Always puzzling, the problem of delegation
of powers has been only more confounded by doubts raised because of the
opinion in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,3 4 in which the Supreme Court, which
in the past had contented itself with copious lip-service to the doctrine that
legislative powers are non-delegable,3 5 for the first time held an act of Con-
National Police Power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (1919) 3 MiNN. L,
REv. 289, 381, 452.
30. Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455 (1886); Patap.
sco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345 (1898); Red "C" Oil
Manufacturing Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380 (1912); Carpenter v. State Bar of
California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 Pac. 23 (1931); City of New Orleans v. Hop Lee, 104 La. 601,
29 So. 214 (1901); American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 312 Pa.
311, 167 Atl. 891 (1933).
31. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wail. 676 (U. S. 1871); Houck v. Little River Drainage
District, 239 U. S. 254, 262 (1915); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Road Improvement
District No. 6, 256 U. S. 658, 660 (1921); Miller County Highway & Bridge District v.
Standard Pipe Line Co., 19 F. (2d) 3, 5 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); State ex rel. Atlantic-Gulf
Special Road and Bridge District v. Bass, 96 Fla. 478, 483, 118 So. 212, 214 (1928), See
1 PAGE A.Nm JoNEs, TAXATIoN By AssEssa-MNr (1909) c. V.
32. Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 705 (1884); Duval Cattle
Co. v. Hemphill, 41 F (2d) 433, 437 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Booth v. Groves, 43 Idaho 703,
255 Pac. 638 (1927) ; 1 PAGE AND Jon s, op. cit. supra note 31, at § 11.
33. The fact that an assessment takes into account facts which have already occurred,
such as ,the past year's production or sales history, will not render it Invalid. Even the
fact that an assessment was for expenses already incurred, and was therefore truly retro-
active, would not avoid it. No successful objection may be made to such an ass msment on
the ground that it was imposed for a benefit already accrued, and was based on what might
be termed an executed consideration. There is no constitutional provision or principle which
prohibits retroactive legislation, although it is disfavored as a matter of statutory construc-
tion. See City of Seattle v. Kelleher, 195 U. S. 351, 359 (1904); Billings v. United States,
232 U. S. 261, 282 (1914); Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U. S. 207, 216 (1915).
34. 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935).
35. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892); People ex re]. Breckon v. Board of Election
Commissioners of Chicago, 221 Il. 9, 77 N. E. 321 (1906); Owensboro & Nashville Rr. Co.
v. Todd, 91 Ky. 175, 15 S. W. 56 (1891); State v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 100 Minn. 445,
I1l N. W. 289 (1907); Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483, 488 (1853); O'Neil v. American Firo
Insurance Co., 166 Pa. 72, 30 Ad. 943 (1895); Fogg v. Union Bank, 60 Tenn. 435 (1872);
Dowling v. Lancashire Insurance Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (1896); Cheadle, The
Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 892.
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gress void because of such delegation 30 But throughout the problem of dele-
gability, from that of the delegability of the power itself to that of the agencies
to which and the manner in which such delegation can be made, recurs the
ultimate criterion of reasonable necessity and expediency for the accomplish-
ment of the legislative program set forth37 That final test has for its foun-
dation the very reason upon which any delegation of power is allowed, namely,
that "to deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. ' '3s And it is im-
portant to note that by its nature the determination of such necessity and ex-
pediency is largely a legislative matter and ought not to be overturned by a
court unless clearly arbitrary.
The power to prescribe the basis of contribution, which is almost invariably
vested, at least in part, in the code authority, apparently would not comply with
any literal test of purely administrative functions.30 But no sharp line can be
36. To the effect that it had not done so before, see United States v. Suburban Motor
Service Corp., 5 F. Supp. 798, 802 (N. D. Ill. 1934); Carpenter, supra note 21, at 126;
Cousens, supra note 21; Comment (1933) 31 Mlicn. L. Rlv. 786, 795, n. 37.
37. St. Louis Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 211 (1902); Buttfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496 (1904); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364,
386 (1907); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 516 (1911); Mutual Film Corpora-
tion v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 245 (1915); Douglas v. Noble, 261
U. S. 165, 169 (1923) ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924) ; Avent v. United States, 266
U. S. 127, 130 (1924); United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 12 (1926);
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928) ; noted in (1928) 37 YAmZ L. J.
1151; Campbell v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 5 F. Supp. 156, 172 (S. D.
N. Y. 1933), appeal dismissed, 291 U. S. 648, 6S6 (1934) ; Edgewater Dairy Co. v. Wallace,
7 F. Supp. 121 (N. D. Ill. 1934); Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 419, 77 Pac. 166, 169
(1904) ; People v. Harper, 91 Ill. 357, 369 (1878) ; State v. Johnson, 75 Afont. 240, 256, 243
Pac. 1073, 1079 (1926); Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric
Light & Power Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908); State v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472,
220 N. W. 929 (1928), noted in (1929) 5 Wis. L. REv. 111; Br.cimay A!m O,-.,., Arjm;-
IsrarvE LvoIs OrAoN A,,,D ADijiOcATi.oN (1934) 61; Frankham, An Analysis of the Dclega-
tions of Power in Some of the Recent Congressional Enactments (1933) 3 Bnoom:,'' L. Rv.
38, 43 if; Comment (1933) 31 MicH. L. Rv. 786, 795 if.
38. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 499 (1873).
39. It is something more than a "filling up the details", as in: Wayman v. Southard,
10 Wheat. 1, 43 (U. S. 1825); In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526 (1S97); Buttfield v. Stranaban,
192 U. S. 470, 496 (1904); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 517 (1911); United
States v. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. 207 (E. D. Wis. 1896); Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Camp, 7 F.
Supp. 139, 141 (N. D. Ga. 1934) ; United States v. Canfield Lumber Co., 7 F. Supp. 694, 697
(D. Neb. 1934) ; BIoxton v. State Highway Commission, 225 Ky. 324, 329, 8 S. W. (2d) 392,
394 (1928); Gima v. Hudson Coal Co., 310 Pa. 480, 165 AUl. 850 (1933). And it is not the
determination of the existence of a contingency upon which the legislature's act bcome3
operative, as in: Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907); Duval Cattle
Co. v. Hemphill, 41 F. (2d) 433, 437 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405, 1GO
N. E. 563 (1913), af'd, 237 U. S. 391 (1915); Iowa Life Insurance Co. v. Eastern Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 64 N. J. L. 340, 347, 45 At. 762, 765 (190D); American Baseball Club
of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 311, 167 AtL 891 (1933), noted in (1933)
2 Go. WAsr. L. REv. 112 and (1934) 32 Miac. L. Rnv. SSS; Dillon Catfish Drainage Dis-
trict v. Bank of Dillon, 143 S. C. 178, 141 S. E. 274 (1928); State v. Zimmerman, 133 Ws.
132, 197 N. W. 823, 826 (1924), noted with disapproval in (1925) 3 Wis. L. Rxv. 124 and
(1925) 34 YArx L. J. 325. In general, see Cheadle, supra note 35.
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drawn between legislative and administrative powers; 40 and the delegation of
functions classified in other cases as legislative in character has been often up-
held.41 The only definitive requirement that can be formulated is that the dele-
gation must be rendered necessary by the exigencies of the situation. 42 Thus if
conditions are such that the legislature could not well lay down a general rule,
and if effective regulation cannot otherwise be achieved, the power is delegable. 43
These principles seem adequate to justify the conclusion that the power to
determine a basis of- assessment is delegable, for it is apparent that the diver-
sity of present-day industrial organization demands a basis designed to meet
the peculiar needs of each individual industry. A self-executing legislative scheme
could not possibly be satisfactory, for the flexibility and discretion of adminis.
trative action are essential.
44
The limitation, revived in the Panama case,8 4 that the power delegated by
the legislature must be something less than complete legislative discretion, that
Congress must retain some color of direction by establishing primary standards.
for the guidance of its delegates, is likely, however, to vitiate the delegation in
the present NIRA because of the absence of such standards therein. The degree
40. Ibid.; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 517 (1911); Mutual Film Corpora-
tion v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.'S. 230, 245 (1915); Chicago & North West-
ern Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 874 (C. C. S. D. Iowa, 1888).
41. The power to prescribe rates has been said to be legislative. Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 499 (1897);
McChord v. Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co., 183 U. S. 483, 495 (1902); Home Telephone
and Teleg. Co. v. City of Los Angeles 211 U. S. 265, 271 (1908); City of Knoxville v. Knox-
ville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 8 (1909); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 433 (1913);
Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 305 (1913); Oklahoma Operating
Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 335 (1920); Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 386 (1932). But it is permissible to delegate that power. Reagan
v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 393 (1894); Intermountain Rate Cases, 234
U. S. 476, 490 (1914). So also, the power to require public utilities to provide certain
facilities is legislative. Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 (1886). Yet it is delegable. Hono.
lulu Rapid Transit and Land Co. v. Hawaii, 211 U. S. 282, 290 (1908). The power to fix
tariff rates is legislative. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S
294, 305 (1933). Yet it is delegable. Id.; Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S,
394 (1928). In general, see Cousens, supra note 21, at 538. That legislative powers are
delegable under certain circumstances has sometimes received express judicial recognition,
St. Louis Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 210 (1902); Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. tInited States, supra; Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 252, 75
N. E. 619, 621 (1905). State v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928), noted (1929)
5 Wis. L. Rzv. 111; Comment (1933) 1 GEo. WAsn. L. Rav. 231; Comment (1924) 37
HARv. L. REv. 1118; Comment (1929) 27 MICu. L. REv. 558.
42. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928), noted in (1928) 37 YALE
L. J. 1151; Edgewater Dairy Co. v. Wallace, 7 F. Supp. 121 (N. D. ill. 1934); Comment
(1924) 37 HARv. L. Rzv. 1118; Comment (1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 5S8.
43. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 386 (1907); Mahler v. Eby, 264
U. S. 32, 40 (1924) ; Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 419, 77 Pac. 166, 169 (1904) ; People v,
Harper, 91 Ill. 357, 369 (1878); State v. Johnson, 75 Mont. 240, 256, 243 Pac, 1073, 1079
(1926); Frankham, loc. cit. supra note 37; Comment (1933) 31 MIcEr. L. REV, 786, 795 ff.
44. The great diversity developed in actual practice would seem to corroborate this. See
the enumeration of the approved bases, supra page 853.
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of definiteness which the Supreme Court may demand of such standards is
highly uncertain, 5 but this determination, too, should be made to rest on con-
siderations of what is possible and practical for the effective operation of the
scheme.46 The exigencies of the situation indicate that a specific provision
granting to the chosen administrative agencies the power to assess equitably the
reasonable and legitimate code costs should prove satisfactory.
At present the delegation of power is to the President, with power in him
to redelegate by approval of codes and by executive orders under Sections 2 (a)
and 2 (b). In practice this redelegation lodges the ultimate assessment func-
tions in the code authorities. Two objections may be urged to this arrangement:
first, against the validity of redelegation; and second, against the validity of
delegation of governmental power to interested private parties. But these can-
not stand up against the ever recurrent consideration of necessity and e-xpedi-
ence to the legislative purpose. Certainly, legislatively authorized redelegation
of a delegable power has never judicially been held objectionable; and the re-
delegation seems warranted here on the basis of expediency became of the
necessity of a complex administrative and supervisory organization. And simi-
larly, no objection to delegation to private parties or quasi-public bodies, such
as the code authorities, has been sustained for that reason alone.47 Judicial
sanction has frequently been accorded delegations of many sorts of govern-
mental functions involving the exercise of essentially legislative discretion to
private organizations. 48  While the self-interest of the members of the code
authorities might cause the courts to look more closely to the reasonableness of
a legislative determination that a delegation of power to them was necessary and
expedient to its legislative program, it is no ground in itself for nullifying the
delegation. If it threatens to create abuses, specific remedies checking their
manifestation are more appropriate, and indeed are provided in administrative
45. See Cousens, supra note 21, at 543, 544.
46. That has been the test in the past. Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, 130 (1924);
United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 12 (1926).
47. The decisions invalidating delegations to private parties can be e.plained for the most
part as based upon the nature of the power delegated rather than upon the character of the
delegate. Sayre, J., dissenting in Whaley v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 156, 52 So. 941, 942 (1910);
Collins v. Hollis, 212 Ala. 294, 102 So. 379 (1924); Dade County v. State, 95 Fla. 465, 4S0,
116 So. 72, 77 (1928); Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 536, 81 N. E. 1109, 1113 (1907);
Bullock v. Billheimer, 175 Ind. 428, 438, 94 N. E. 763, 767 (1911); State v. Crawford, 104
Kans. 141, 143, 177 Pac. 360, 361 (1919) ; Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451, 463 (1874) ;
State v. Holland, 37 Mont. 393, 404, 96 Pac. 719, 722 (1903); Rowe v. Ray, 120 Neb. 118,
123, 231 N. W. 689, 691 (1930) ; Winters v. Hughes, 3 Utah 443, 449, 24 Pac. 759, 761 (1861).
48. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 703 (1880); Butte City Water Co. v.
Baker, 196 U. S. 119 (1905); St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210
U. S. 281, 287 (1908); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 169 (1923); Ex parte Gerino, 143
Cal. 412, 419, 77 Pac. 166, 169 (1904) ; Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 90 Pac. 702 (1937);
Day v. City of St. Augustine, 104 Fla. 261, 273, 139 So. 880, 885 (1932); Wilkins v. State
113 Ind. 514, 16 N. E. 192 (1888); Overshiner v. State, 156 Ind. 187, 59 N. E. 468 (1901);
Scholle v. State, 90 Md. 729, 742, 46 Ad. 326, 327 (1900); Gima v. Hudson Coal Co, 310
Pa. 480, 165 AUt. 850 (1933); Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rnv. 80. In Nicchia v. People of the
State of New York, 254 U. S. 228 (1920), and Storey v. City of Seattle, 124 Wash. 598, 215
Pac. 514 (1923), the powers delegated might be considered as purely administrative.
1935]
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practice.49 Furthermore, the fact that the method of assessment might be pre-
scribed in the codes themselves, cannot detract from the validity of the delega-
tion of a discretionary power in that respect, directly or indirectly, to the code
authorities. It is true that since the validity of the delegation is dependent
upon its necessity, that delegation must not extend beyond the exigencies which
warrant it. But the decision as to what the exigencies warrant must be, in the
absence of arbitrariness or capriciousness, primarily a legislative matter. And
so the greater administrative efficacy and flexibility afforded to meet rapidly
changing or diverse conditions in an industry by lodging the power in the code
authorities would provide ample reason both to deny the arbitrariness of the
delegation and positively to establish its expediency.60
Because all these matters of delegability are inextricably bound up in a deter,
mination of legislative necessity and expediency, with which there can be little
cavil on the score of reasonableness, that determination ought properly to rest
with Congress. But Congress has not unequivocally expressed its will. The
present allocation of power must be spelled out of the authorization to the Presi-
dent to approve codes of fair competition and to issue executive orders. Much
doubt would be avoided and the code assessments rendered less vulnerable to
attack if the delegation were expressly and properly enacted into the new NIRA.
Thus not only should there be provision that reasonable and legitimate code
costs are to be assessed fairly and equitably among all those subject to the code,
but that it is to be done on a basis prescribed by the code and/or the code
authority, the distribution of the latter power between the code and the code
authority to be determined by the code. Under such provision the framers of
the code either could set up a complete schedule and basis of assessments, leav-
ing only administrative functions in the code authority, or could give to the
code authority full power to determine, impose and collect the costs, subject
only to the restrictions present in the delegation by the NIRA, or subject to
additional restrictions and specifications in the code.
One further basis for attack upon the validity of assessments is violation of
due process of law in the procedural sense. The model code provision( requireg
in substance that the assessments be fair and equitable, that the expenses be
reasonable in amount and limited to legitimate costs of code administration,
that the money collected be actually used only to defray such expenses, and
49. See a discussion of the safeguards now in force, infra at page 861.
So. A further possible objection to the delegation of the power to levy ass e sments 1s
that, in view of Section 3(f), it involves the power to define a crime. But it is now well
settled, especially in the federal courts, that such an objection is untenable if the statute
itself declares that violation of the administrative regulation constitutes a criminal offenge
and fixes the punishment therefor. In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526 (1897) ; Union Bridge Co.
v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911);
United States v. Smull, 236 U. S. 405 (1915) ; Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127 (1924);
United States v. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. 207 (E. D. Wis. 1896); Campbell v. Chase Nat. Bank of
City of New York, 9 F. Supp. 156, 173 (S. D. N. Y. 1933), appeal dismissed, 291 U. S. 648,
686 (1934); Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 90 Pac. 702 (1907); City of New Orleans
v. fop Lee, 104 La. 601, 29 So. 214 (1901). But cf. Sayre, J., dissenting, in Whaley v.
State, 168 Ala. 152, 156, 52 So. 941, 942 (1910); State v. Holland, 37 Mont. 393, 404, 96
Pac. 719, 722 (1908).
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that each member be given notice of the assessment and an opportunity to pro-
test against its invalidity before being considered in default. Nothing less would
satisfy the requirements of due process. But these provisions are found only
in the codes which have adopted the model provision,0 and even in such codes
the failure to guarantee these requisites by express statutory provision may
militate against due process.51 And once more the NIRA should resolve the
doubt by expressly incorporating these limitations, at least, upon the power to
levy assessments. Furthermore, proper provision should be made directing
the consummation of the requirements of due process in actual administration.
Thus a statutory basis might properly be laid for the administrative machinery
which now provides reasonably adequate safeguards to assure not only due
process but also an efficient and fair administration.
As the NRA is now organized, approval of the itemized budget and basis of
assessment submitted by the code authority is given only after interested parties
have been afforded a hearing or opportunity to be heard. The latter consists of
the privilege to file with the proper Deputy Administrator written objections
to the proposed budget and basis of contribution together with supporting facts.
An office memorandum for the guidance of deputy administrators indicates that
approval will be withheld unless the budget shows plainly the period of time em-
braced, includes only items authorized by provisions of the code and omits pre-
code expenses. Also the basis of contribution must conform with the provisions
of the code, must be reasonable in amount, equitable in operation and properly
related to the budget; it must indicate the members from whom contributions
are required, the amount payable or method of calculation, and the intervals at
which payments are to be made. Further, assurance must be given that appro-
priate provisions for safeguarding the funds will be adopted; the person or per-
sons to receive such funds must be designated and must give adequate security. -
In granting approval the NIRB, acting through a Deputy Administrator, may as-
sist the code authority in paring down the budget.53 Upon approval, the a-ess-
ment may be levied. But notice must be given to each member assessed, setting
forth the basis of contribution and the fact of its approval. The notice must also
state that a member may lodge a protest with the code authority or with the
Compliance Division of NRA within fifteen days on the ground that the assess-
ment is unjust as applied to him and finally, that nonpayment after thirty days
is a code violation. The assessment does not, however, become collectible until
certification by the code authority to the Compliance Division of NRA that
such notice has been given, that the assessment remains unpaid after thirty days
and that no protest was filed within fifteen days, or that such protest was filed
and overruled, provided that the trade or industry embraces the member's prin.
51. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890); Kuntz
v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N. E. 474 (1889); Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183 (1878). Sce
Wrouo av, PpsicPLps or LEGIsLriaE ORGAVTZAIOIT AND Amm, srTaui0m; (1934) IS2.
52. 2 NRA Rep. 263 (1934). And see Administrative Order No. X-119, Dec. S, 1934.
53. Some suggestions have been made to the code authorities by NRA as to the items
properly to be included in the budgets. NRA Release No. 47S4, May 1, 1934. And de-
tailed instructions to auditors necessarily exert a similar influence. 1 Prm,-ncr-uxr, Trn.D"
AND LOusTRY SmvicE, par. 8611.
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cipal line of business and that the code authorizes the assessment.0 4 Thus the
practice now set up does appear to satisfy the enumerated requirements of the
code provisions so as to meet the demands of due process; and what is more,
it gives the protective assurance of governmental supervision of the assessment
procedure before collection activities are allowed. The supervisional aspect is
further extended by the NRA administrative requirement that accurate accounts
be kept of the funds collected by the code authority, periodic reports submitted
to the Compliance Division and an annual audit made by an independent out-
side agency. Additional protection is afforded by the provision that the funds
collected shall be held in trust for code purposes.0 Some reference ought to be
had in NIRA to provision for these checks and for the installation of an amount
of administrative supervision sufficient to forestall and remedy any abuses that
may develop. But these ought not to be enacted in such detail as to take away
the flexibility necessary to the maintenance of administrative efficiency. 1
Together with the assurances of notice and administrative supervision of the
code assessment, the parties subject to the code must be provided with reason-
able opportunity to challenge both the validity of the assessment in general and
its application to them in particular. Those dissenters who challenge the con-
stitutionality of the code authority's power to impose assessments upon them
may do so by direct resorts to the constitutional courts. 0 But for those who,
admitting the general validity of the assessment power, wish only to challenge
the validity of the particular assessment, there are available in addition to judi-
cial remedies certain administrative remedies, developed in NRA practice, but
not specifically provided for in NIRA. In the first place, appearance may be
made or papers filed at the hearing or opportunity to be heard before a Deputy
Administrator when the budget and basis of contribution are submitted for ap.
proval. 6 The objections apparently available at this time are those against the
basis of contribution as constituting an inequitable general rule for the industry
or against items in the budget because they are unreasonable or are unauthorized
by the code. Complaints based upon individual injustices are to be taken by
protest filed within fifteen days after receipt of the notice of assessment.61 Mat-
ters pertinent here are reasons why the basis of contribution operates unfairly
upon the particular protestant because of the unusual character of his business
or an overlapping of assessments under several codes, the most dreaded assess.
ment problem.14 These, the only administrative remedies provided under the ex-
isting arrangements, are derived from NRA administration. Their validity
might also be bolstered by specific authorizing reference in NIRA. It is prob-
able that where the complaint is directed against one of the defects which these
administrative remedies are designed to cure, these remedies must be pursued
before any resort can be had to the courts for relief. The effect that findings
54. Administrative Order No. X-36, May 26, 1934.
55. Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 661 (1915); Ohio Valley Water
Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 56 (1932) ;
Freund, The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies (1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q. 207;
Tollefson, Administrative Finality (1931) 29 Micir. L. REV. 839; Comment (1932) 41 YALz
L. J. 1037.
56. 2 NRA Rep. 264 (1934).
57. Administrative Order No. X-36, May 26, 1934.
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made in such a proceeding would have in court is uncertain, but their weight is
questionable because they are reached very informally and without a record.V 3
No provision is found in the Act or codes regarding possible judicial determi-
nation of a member's rights at his suit, but reasonable opportunity to obtain
such determination cannot be denied him. Thus in absence of a separate set of
tribunals to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising
out of NRA, judicial remedies are open to the complainant. If he seeks declara-
tory judgment 0 or injunction,cO judicial doctrine would not require him to be-
come liable for punishment for a code violation before he can seek relief. Only
the possibility that he has not first exhausted his administrative remedies can
be interposed. 61 But if payment under protest and suit for recovery of the
money so paid on the ground that it was collected without constitutional author-
ity are allowed, -6 2 the adequacy of the legal remedy thus provided might pre-
clude the possibility of injunctive relief.63 In any event, he may, if he chooses,
do nothing until he is sued or prosecuted for failure to pay, and then he may
interpose his defenses. His failure to have first taken the available administra-
tive remedies would not constitute a waiver of those defenses." Probably the
most satisfactory method to avoid the difficulties arising from default would
be to enact into the new NIRA a provision whereby payment under protest is
made a condition of suit to contest the validity of an assessment.
Contrasted with this is the problem of effective enforcement of code assess-
ments, if they should be held valid. A failure or refusal to pay an assessment
may, of course, be deemed a violation of the code and an unfair trade practice.
58. See Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 599.
59. The federal courts now have jurisdiction to grant such relief. 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S.
C. A. § 400 (1934). That it is peculiarly adapted to such a situation as that here presented,
see BORC EAD, DECLARATORY JUDGamrE'S (1934) c. XIII.
60. Injunction is, of course, subject to the usual equity rules. Other posable remedies
against an administrative body, but either inapplicable or unavailable here, include manda-
mus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto. See BLAcirLY A-., OA.%TN.- op. cit. supa
note 37, at 185 et seq.
61. Cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1903); fellon Co. v. McCaf-
ferty, 239 U. S. 134 (1915) ; Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, (1932). But this
objection apparently applies only to remedies directed at securing a proper legislative result.
Bacon v. Rutland Rr. Co., 232 U. S. 134 (1914); Schlosser v. Welsh, S F. Supp. 993, 997
(D. S. D. 1934). Hence it would probably be applicable only to such defects as might b2
remedied by existing administrative procedure, e.g., the inequity of a basis of asessnment.
Cf. 4 PoamEoy, Eun-r JuissRPuDDsca (4th ed. 1918) § 1800 and the many cases there
cited on the related problem of taxation.
62. In cases involving federal taxation recovery can be had even though the payment
was voluntary, the filing of a claim for refund being a condition precedent to suit. 43 SrTA.
343 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 156 (1926). The statute prohibits injunctive relief agai-t
federal taxes. R. S. § 3224 (1878), 26 U. S. C. A. § 154 (1926).
63. To the effect that this result has been reached in tax cases in some of the states, see
4 Po mRoy, op. cit. supra note 61, at § 1805.
64. Pursuit of administrative remedies has never been considered except in cases where
suit was brought to assert the invalidity of legislation. But a similar result might be reached
by according finality to the administrative determination as a finding of fact. But see Com-
ment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 599.
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By specific legislative provisions the proper United States district attorney may
sue to enjoin the violation of the NRA code or make it the basis of a criminal
prosecution, or the Federal Trade Commission may issue a cease and desist
order.0 5 And so, too, under the code provisions and administrative orders, the
privilege of displaying the NRA insignia may be withheld or withdrawn.00 But
these actions look toward inducing the recalcitrant enterprisers to pay by indi-
rect means because of their in terrorem character; they do not purport to en-
force payment directly. And they are also likely to prove ineffective because
placed in the hands of busy officers to whom collection is unimportant. 7 Ob-
viously the compulsory assessment power, necessarily and impliedly authorized
by the NIRA, must include as a necessary incident the power of collection; that
power can be made truly effective only by allowing the interested code author-
ity to bring suit for unpaid assessments.
Unfortunately, the existing NRA structure does not make it clear whether
such a suit may be brought. If the doctrine is applied that where a statute
creates a new right and grants a remedy therefor, the remedy is exclusive,0 8 the
code authority could have no cause of action for compulsory code assessments.
Whatever right may exist to compulsory payment of code costs is derived ulti-
mately from NIRA, which contains only the express remedies mentioned above
for the enforcement of rights under it. Moreover, the enumeration in NIRA of
these remedies, by the exclusive remedy doctrine, necessarily rebuts any impli-
cation of authority to the code authorities to bring suit for unpaid assessments
against non-assenters. But until the new NIRA obviates this difficulty by spe-
cific authorization to code authorities to sue for assessments, resort will have
to be had to establishing the nonapplicability of the exclusive remedy doctrine in
this class of cases. Thus it may be argued that since none of the remedies speci-
fied in the Act really enforces the obligation to pay, except by indirection, they
are not remedies for the wrong here complained of. Or, from another angle,
the right is vested in the code authority, whereas the statutory remedies are
given only to the government.6D This would permit an application of the gen-
eral principle that when a statute imposes a duty for the special benefit of a
65. 48 STAT. 196, 15 U. S. C. A. § 703 (b), (e), (f) (1933); 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 19
U. S. C. A. § 45 (1926).
66. NRA Release No. 5379, May 28, 1934.
67. See Comment (1934) 28 ILL. L. REv. 673, 678 ff.
68. Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520, 527 (U. S. 1874); Fourth Nat. Bank of the City of
New York v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747 (1887); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U. S.
356 (1908); Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459 (1917); Decorative Stone Co. v.
Building Trades Council of Westchester County, 23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). For
discussions of the NRA cases considering this question, see Billig, Fridinger and Herrick,
The Worker's Day in Court: Employee's Right to Code Wages (1934) 3 GEo. WAs1r. L. Rzv.
1; Rosenbaum, Enforcement of the NIRA and Codes by Private Injunctive Proceedings
(1934) 8 U. or CiN. L. REv. 155; Comment (1935) 20 CoRm. L. Q. 240, at 245; Note
(1934) 48 HAzv. L. R.v. 342; Comment (1934) 28 ILr. L. REv. 673, at 684; Comment (1934)
29 ILL. L. REv. 396; Comment (1934) 44 YALE: L. J. 90, at 98; (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 480.
69. Note, however, that where the code gives the code authority a remedy, viz,, depriva-
tion of participation, for the right, it specifically provides that that remedy is not exclusive.
Can Manufacturers, Schedule B, § 9; Gas Appliances and Apparatus, art. III, § 2; Non.
Ferrous Foundry, art. VII (c).
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certain class of persons any member of that class has a right of action for the
injury suffered as a result of violation of that duty.-0 Added to this is the ortho-
dox doctrine, applied in similar situations, that an obligation to pay a sum cer-
tain or readily ascertainable can always be enforced in an action of debt by the
person to whom it is owing, here the code authority.7' Further, the doctrine of
exclusive remedies is purely a rule of statutory construction, which will yield
to a contrary legislative intent.72 Such a result ought to be reached in this situ-
ation because the same reasoning by which the power to levy the assessments
is implied would indicate a legislative intent that their effective collection should
be made possible. Upon such a rationale the validity of those code provisions
which specifically empower the code authorities to sue for assessments 73 may
be sustained as to collection from those who have refused to consent to the codes.
Yet to avoid the possible application of a holding that the remedies in the Act
are exclusive, provision ought to be made in the NIRA authorizing the code
authorities to bring suit.
Although such authorization would apply to suits against any member of an
industry, it is, of course, not essential to recovery against those who have volun-
tarily assented to the codes. Clearly, they are subject to suit. They may be
said to have agreed to this liability by their assent to the code either because
of the specific authorization therein to be sued or because of an implication to
be drawn from the power of collection specified in the code.74 Since the right
of the code authority to sue for payment against them is not derived from NIRA,
but is based on the code itself, the possible limitation of remedies under NTIRA
does not apply. Or the right of action in the code authorities can be worked
out on a purely contractual basis, the promise of payment to the code authori-
ties having for consideration either the benefits derived from the activities of
the code authority or the similar promises made by other members of the in-
dustry.
75
Granting that the power of code authorities to sue for unpaid assessments is
70. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39 (1916); Fairport, PaineA le &
Eastern Rr. Co. v. Meredith; 292 U. S. 589 (1934) ; Beauchamp v. Sturges & Burn Co., 250
Ill. 303, 95 N. E. 204 (1911); Cheek v. The Prudential Insurance Co., 192 S. W. 387 (Mo.
1917).
71. Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet. 486, 493 (U. S. 1839); Stockwell v. United States,
13 Wall. 531, 541 (U. S. 1371) ; The Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 238
(U. S. 1874) ; United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190, 197 (1909) ; United States v. Chain-
berlin, 219 U. S. 250, 258, 262 (1911).
72. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U. S. 356, 367 (1903).
73. Code provisions cited in note 8, supra, first par.; Anti-Hog-Cholera Serum and Hog-
Cholera Virus, art. VI, § 2(b); Underwear and Allied Products Manufacturing, Part IV,
§ 1 (h).
74. Code provisions cited in note 8, supra, first par.; Anti-Hog-Cholera Serum and Hog-
Cholera Virus, art. VI, § 2 (b); Bowling and Billard Operating, art VI, § 7 (f); Labor
Provisions for the Brewing Industry, art. VI, B, § 3; Construction, art. IV, A, § 2 (h), B,
§ 2 (e); Daily Newspaper, art. VI, § 3 (e); Labor Provisions for the Distilled Spirits In-
dustry, art. VI, B, § 7; Fishery, art. VfI, tit. E, § 1 (a); General Contractors' Divi-ion,
art. II, A, § 2; Investment Bankers, art. III, § 6; Refractories, art. I; Underwear and
Allied Products Manufacturing, Part I r, § 1 (h).
75. This, however, is subject to the weaknesses pointed out in note 15, supra.
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made clear either by statutory authorization or by judicial interpretation, the
efficacy of that power may yet depend upon clarification of capacities in which
such suit may be brought. If the code authority is incorporated, as it may be
under the provisions of some codes, 76 it may of course bring suit in its corporate
name. If not, it is not a legal entity and ordinarily would lack capacity to bring
suit in its own name.77 But if code authorities may properly be regarded as
unincorporated associations, as it seems they may, they would find statutory au-
thority to sue in certain states in their own names as such organizations. 78
Under the Conformity Act 79 these statutes would probably apply also to suits
brought in the federal courts within those states.80 The express provisions in
76. Barber Shop, art. VI, § 6 (b) ; Construction, art. IV, C, § 3; Handkerchief, art. VI,
§ 5 (a); Men's Clothing, art. XIII (g); Millinery, art. VI, § 8; Restaurant, art. VIII, § I
(g); Retail, art. X, § 2 (g); Shoe Rebuilding, art. VI, § 5 (b); Wholesale Food and Gro-
cery, art. VIII, § 6.
77. Agricultural Extension Club of Nevada County v. M. Hirsch & Son, 39 Cal. App,
433, 179 Pac. 430 (1919); Presbyterian Church of Paralta, Linn County v. Johnson, 213
Iowa 49, 238 N. W. 456 (1931); Adams v. Richardson, 268 Mass. 78, 167 N. E. 254 (1929) ;
Detroit Schuetzenbund v. Detroit Agitations Verein, 44 Mich. 313, 6 N. W. 675 (1880); St.
Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725
(1905); Danbury Cornet Band v. Bean, 54 N. H. 524 (1874); VRaorTrnoTozr, Tru, LAW ol
UtmcopoRA"ED AssocAOTios (2d ed. 1923) § 70, and cases cited in n. 1 therein; Sturges,
Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 383.
It has been said that this is not the federal rule. Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F. (2d) 266, 269
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Johnston v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 1289, 134 So. 563, 565 (1931).
But these cases misinterpret the decision in United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 383 (1922), which was based on the peculiar nature of a labor
union and on statutory recognition of it as a legal entity. See Moffatt Tunnel League v.
United States, 289 U. S. 113, 118 (1933); United States and Cuban Allied Works Engineer.
ing Corporation v. Lloyds, 291 Fed. 889, 891 (S. D. N. Y. 1923); Brown v. Protestant
Episcopal Church of the United States of America, 8 F. (2d) 149, 150 (E. D. La. 1925).
78. ALA. CODE AwN. (Michie, 1928) § 5723; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5490; MD. Aux.
CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 104; MIcu. CoAn'. LAWs (1929) § 14020; N. J. Com'. STAT.
(Supp. 1930) § 163-40; VT. Pun. LAWS (1933) § 1526; VA. CODE (Michle, 1930) §
6058; Wyo. REv. STAT. AiN. (Courtright, 1931) § 28-908. But where the statutory pro.
vision refers only to associations of persons "in a business," the Code Authority would prob-
ably not be allowed to bring suit. Warman Steel Casting Co. v. Redondo Beach Chamber
of Commerce, 34 Cal. App. 37, 166 Pac. 856 (1917); St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Book-
binders' Union, No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725 (1905); Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb.
252, 92 N. W. 306 (1902), 96 N. W. 212 (1903), 98 N. W. 1075 (1904), 75 Neb. 273, 105
N. W. 1092 (1905). But cf. Herald v. Glendale Lodge, B. P. 0. E. of United States, 46
Cal. App. 325, 189 Pac. 329 (1920). ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 96, § 30, and N. Y. Comorn
LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1932) c. 20, § 12, provide respectively for suit in the name of trustees
and of president or treasurer.
79. R. S. § 914 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. § 724 (1926).
80. To the effect that such statutes relate only to the remedy, see United States Heater
Co. v. Iron Molders' Union of North America, 129 Mich. 3S4, 363, 88 N. V. 889, 893 (1902);
Warner v. Beers, 23 Wend. 103, 119 (N. Y. 1840). And the Conformity Act applies to the
question of capacity to sue in one's own name in general. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Humble, 181 U. S. 57, 60 (1901); N. & G. Taylor Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 275 U. S. 431,
437 (1928); New York Evening Post v. Chaloner, 265 Fed. 204, 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
But cf. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 391 (1922).
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some codes that the code authority may sue for unpaid assessments in its titular
capacity,8 ' if accepted as of equal dignity with an act of Congress, would be con-
trolling in the state as well as federal courts, as part of the paramount federal
law,82 to give to each of those code authorities power to sue as an entity. Other-
wise suit must be brought in the names of the individual members. Those code
authorities not enabled by incorporation or statute or code provision to sue as an
entity cannot achieve the same result by representative suits. The statutes per-
mitting such suits are invariably limited to cases where the parties are so numer-
ous that it would be impractical or excessively expensive to bring them all into
court.8 3 This is obviously not the case with code authorities. Definite provision
in the NIRA is needed to assure all code authorities the convenient capacity to
sue as such.
Admitting the capacity of the code authorities or their individual members to
sue, further clarification of the jurisdiction of the various courts to entertain
suits by code authorities would also be desirable. Since there is nothing in the
NIRA or the codes to indicate an intention that the federal jurisdiction over
such suits should be exclusive, the code authorities are entitled to invoke the con-
current jurisdictions 4 of either the federal or state courts as matters of right.c5
In invoking federal jurisdiction, however, if the right of action of the code au-
thority is claimed to be derived solely from the assent of the member sued to
the code contract, the requirements of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional
amount would have to be met. But if the basis of the right is derived from
NIRA, as it would have to be in the case of a non-assenter, and as it would
indubitably be in cases of both assenters and non-assenters were NIRA to grant
code authorities express power to sue for code assessments, then a different case
would be presented. Such an action might then be held to come within the terms
of Section 24 of the Judicial Code, which vests jurisdiction in the United States
district courts of all suits arising under any law regulating commerce;
80 the code
assessment powers derived from NIRA, like the rest of the program, to be valid,
must be related to the commerce power. In that event federal jurisdiction would
exist regardless of the amount in controversy
s or the citizenship of the parties8
3
81. Code provisions cited in note 8, supra, first par., and also Underwear and Allied
Products Manufacturing, Part. IV, § 1 (h).
82. U. S. Coxs'., Art. VI, par. 2. But it may be doubted that the provisions were in-
tended to have this effect. Once more statutory darification would be helpful.
83. See collection of statutes in Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous
Litigants (1934) 19 CoRe. L. Q. 399.
84. Claflin-v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136 (1876); Robb v. Connolly, Ill U. S. 624,
635 (1884); Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 4S9
(1912); General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 261,
286 (1922); Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 37 (1926); Grubb v. Public Utilities Com-
mission of Ohio, 281 U S. 470, 475 (1930); Guiterman v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 48 F. (2d)
851 (E. D. N. Y. 1931).
85. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55 (1912).
86. 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 38 STAT. 219 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (8) (1926).
87. Turner, Dennis & Lowry Lumber Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.,
271 U. S. 259 (1926); Davis v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 293 Fed. 591 (C. C. A. Sth,
1923); Katz v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 32 F. (2d) 14
(E. D. N. Y. 1929).
88. Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. S. Segari & Co., 205 Fed. 998 (E. D. La. 1913). Diversity
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If the present indications that NRA is to be continued substantially as it now
stands are to be realized, some attention should be devoted in drafting the new
Act to the problems raised by code assessments.89 Existing uncertainties re-
quire clarification; legal weaknesses demand removal. More positive safeguards
must be provided for individual rights, and more adequate machinery estab-
lished for administrative efficiency. Furthermore, all this must be guaranteed
in the new NIRA itself.
of citizenship would be immaterial, anyway, since the suit is certainly one arising under tho
laws of the United States.
89. There have been eight cases involving the validity of code assessments: Schlesinger
v. Kofsky-Moos, Inc., U. S. L. Week, Jan. 8, 1935, at 424, col. 1 (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1934) (up-
holding assessments under Schackno Act); Friedman v. John Lowry, Inc., N. Y. L. J,, Jan.
5, 1935, at 83, col. 3 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935) (holding assessments not authorized by New
York Recovery Act); In the Matter of the National Department Stores, Inc., 1 Pna~rcr-
HALL TADE min INousTY SERwcE, par. 8130 (E. D. Pa. 1934) (ordering receivers of bank-
rupt to pay assessment); United States v. MacEntire, NRA Release No. 8694, Nov. 7, 1934
(E. D. S. C. 1934) (consent decree enjoining non-payment); United States v. L. Brinkley
Co., NRA Release No. 9149, Dec. 7, 1934 (E. D. S. C. 1934) (same); United States v.
Breece Lumber Co., NRA Release No. 8789, Nov. 13, 1934 (D. Ohio 1934) (continuing
restraining order); Schlesinger v. Industrial Fur Dyers, U. S. L. Week, Jan. 29, 1935, at
484, col. 3 (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1934) (default judgment); Vaughn v. Pat Brown, Inc., U. S.
L. Week, Jan. 29, 1935, at 484, col. 3 (Mun. Ct. Greensboro, N. C. 1934) (overruling de-
murer to complaint for "money due and owing"). Newspaper reports seem to indicate an
increasing tendency to contest the validity of assessments in the courts.
